

9. Nordlinger, *Autonomy of the Democratic State*.
10. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
11. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in *ibid.*, 3-37.
12. Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2 (January 1984), 226.
13. Cf. the "new institutionalism" literature as synthesized by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 734-49.
14. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1947), 102.
15. Huntington, *Political Order*.
16. Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29-30; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," 4.
17. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*, 55-57.
18. See Nordlinger, *Autonomy of the Democratic State*, 27-31, for such a typology.
19. Compare the formulation in Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review* 62, no. 1 (March 1968): 144-68.
20. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, 347.
21. Tilly, 42, 54, 73-74.
22. Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Peter B. Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); David C. Becker, *The New Bourgeoisie and the Limits of Dependency: Mining, Class, and Power in "Revolutionary" Peru* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983); Evans in this volume.
23. David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 4 (December 1978): 1243-61.
24. Leo Panitch, *Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
25. Alexis de Toqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, translated by Gilbert Stuart [1856] (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), 183.

Copyright 1987 © Eric A. Nordlinger. Used by permission.

JOEL S. MIGDAL

Strong States, Weak States: Power and Accommodation

TWO IMAGES OF THE STATE

It has been a generation since decolonization abruptly transformed the world map. But we still do not have a very clear picture of the relationship of politics and social change in former colonies, let alone effective theories to explain why things are as they are. An odd duality, or even contradiction, has marked the social science literature. One portrait gleaned from scholarly works has set politics — especially the state — at center stage, kneading society into new forms and shapes, adapting it to the exigencies created by industrialization or other stimuli. This is the image of the strong state. A second perspective portrays the state as nearly hapless in the swirl of dizzying social changes that have overtaken these societies, changes largely independent of any impetus from the state itself. Some scholars view the dynamics of these changes within the country's borders while others see these uncontrollable forces coming from large powers and the world economy. In both instances, the image is of a weak state.

The word "state" itself, ironically, at first did not figure prominently in either of these two images. In fact, it has become an almost commonplace criticism in recent years that the state was a neglected variable in theories of social and political change for most of the postwar era.¹ That criticism,

¹This article is adapted from the forthcoming book, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* by Joel S. Migdal.

1988.

Joel Migdal

however, may be somewhat overstated. In third-world studies, at least, one could probably better say that the state was more assumed or taken for granted than neglected during the 1950s and 1960s. Many social scientists writing about non-Western societies saw the conscious manipulation of social life — public policy — as a central ingredient of the social histories and futures of newly independent societies. Such manipulation, of course, lies at the heart of politics. The concept of the state came to be assumed, rather than dealt with in more explicit terms, only because politics was often viewed as the outgrowth of other sorts of more fundamental processes (for example, those in economic life or in communications). Or politics and states were subsumed within larger constructs, such as “centers” and “modern sectors,” which were portrayed as the movers (or potential movers) in shaping new social habits, a new national consciousness, and new politics in formerly intractable peripheries.

It was not until Samuel Huntington's well-known article in the 1965 volume of *World Politics*, “Political Development and Political Decay,” that politics as an independent and autonomous enterprise became a widely accepted notion.² Even then, however, the acceptance of the centrality of politics (and the notion of the state itself) did not lead to unanimity about the capabilities of states. One still finds projected in the literature of the 1970s and 1980s the two images of states — sometimes the very same state — as both strong and weak. Many scholars tended to dismiss existing third-world states as ineffective manipulators of social life. Huntington himself began his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* by noting that the major distinction between states lies not in their type of government but in the degree to which the government really governs.³ Or as Ariside Zolberg put it with respect to African states, “The major problem is not too much authority, but too little.”⁴ While holding out hope and even giving prescriptions for political institutionalization, consolidation, and centralization of states, many authors found third-world states to be disorganized, confused conglomerates of people and agen-

cies. Instability and ineptness stood out as primary subjects of inquiry.

At the same time, the image of the strong third-world state managed to hold its own, or even to increase in importance. This perspective was undoubtedly influenced by studies of Western societies. The Western state's autonomy (or at least relative autonomy) and its ability to organize social groups and to penetrate deeply into the fabric of society became major topics of research.⁵ And to a considerable degree within the last decade, the presumptions about the Western state have spilled over into the study of non-Western ones. Literature on states, particularly those in Latin America and East Asia, emphasizes how they reshape societies. States promote some groups and classes while repressing others, all the while maintaining autonomy from any single group or class.

The activism and strength of the third-world state in regulating, even shaping, the eruptive conflicts that come from industrialization and the mobilization of new social groups have been emphasized in theories of corporatism and the bureaucratic authoritarian state.⁶ The state, wrote James Malloy, “is characterized by strong and relatively autonomous governmental structures that seek to impose on the society a system of interest representation based on enforced limited pluralism.”⁷

Although this second image of the state in the third-world as robust and capable was influenced by recent works on the West, it had also been inchoate in many of the earlier studies of non-Western societies written in the 1950s and 1960s. Even before the word state became fashionable, Charles Anderson noted the attraction to such an image in Latin American studies. “Many contemporary notions about development,” he remarked, “seem to posit government as a kind of ‘omnipotent given’ that could if it would set matters right.”⁸ Although contemporary corporatist and bureaucratic authoritarian theories are often less sanguine about the state's setting matters right, they do continue to attribute great strength to the state, even if they regard those capabilities as malevolent.

Yet a close look at some writings even on a country such as

Mexico, which is assumed to house a strong, active state, once again reveals the curious duality of images. Notions of state ineptness still come creeping through. To some field researchers, the "omnipotent given" appears impotent at times, so much so that some descriptions of so-called bureaucratic authoritarian or other imposing states in Latin America and Asia take on many of the hues of accounts of less-capable African states. Prior to undertaking her work on Mexican state autonomy during the tenure of President Lázaro Cárdenas, for example, Nora Hamilton was struck by an odd contradiction. The state played an important role in stimulating Mexico's dramatic economic growth but seemed "unable or unwilling to direct the Mexican economy so that growth benefits all of Mexico's populations."⁸ Merilee Serrill Grindle, focusing on the policy process much more carefully, observed the same sort of duality in Mexico. She noted that if political development is thought of as the capacity to govern then the Mexican regime is quite advanced. "Together with the rest of the political class in Mexico, the bureaucratic elite has developed vertical power relationships throughout the society. . . .¹⁰ Despite this power, the bureaucratic elite suffered nasty setbacks in attempting to pursue a redistributive policy in the rural areas. Grindle described in her case study how local-level resistance successfully foiled state leaders from achieving their purposes.

Other authors on Latin America echo this uncertainty about state power. One serious doubter is Linn Hammergren:

It is true that constitutions and legislation often accord enormous powers of control to central governments, but the question remains as to whether this control is actually exercised or exists only on paper. The limited success of Latin American governments in enforcing their own legislation suggests that the extent of this control is not great.¹¹

Similar statements have come out of Asia. In her chapter on "Failures of Implementation" in India, Francine Frankel noted numerous instances of the disjuncture between announced state policies and the actual conformity of society to those policies. One example was state encouragement of

cooperative bodies, which could serve as strong "peoples institutions." Personnel and resources proliferated in the State Departments of Cooperation.

This far-reaching administrative apparatus was vested with formidable powers. State acts gave the registrar and his organization extensive regulatory and executive authority over the whole range of operations of cooperative societies. These powers included control over registration of new societies, inspection of finances, arbitration of disputes, supersession of negligent managing committees, annual audit, and even liquidation. . . . Altogether, these powers provided more than adequate leverage for the implementation of the Planning Commission's policy linking credit to an approved production plan and repayment in kind through crop deliveries to a cooperative marketing society.¹²

The program, however, ended up a failure. The intended clients received little. Local resources were not mobilized as intended. The powers invested in the policy implementors were not sufficient to overcome those bent on changing the policy's purpose.

THE DILEMMA OF STATE LEADERS

How can we account for these conflicting portraits of the state in the third world? Which image better depicts the real abilities and character of states? To answer these questions, we must place the state back into context. States operate in two intersecting arenas. The first is the world arena in which state officials interact with representatives of other states, large corporations, international organizations, and an assortment of other transnational actors. The second arena is the society that the state seeks to rule.

State leaders face obvious constraints in the sorts of actions they can take beyond their borders in the world arena: war is always a lurking threat. States also face severe, if more subtle, constraints from the world arena in what they can do domestically as a result of the particular niche their society occupies in the world economy. The societies they wish to rule are part of a larger world social system with established relations of trade, investment, borrowing, movement of labor, and more that have their origins in precolonial days. This

social system has created a worldwide pattern of stratification as well as domestic patterns of stratification. It is only at the greatest peril that state leaders can ignore in domestic policy the power relations generated within the world social system.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to assume (as many writers have) that these power relations determine totally the domestic stratification pattern and the character of state-society relations in third-world countries. The second arena within which states operate, that of the domestic society, allows for important social dynamics and has room for significant state maneuvering. It is here that state leaders seek to maximize their autonomy whenever and wherever possible, even within a context of constraints from world forces.¹³ Likewise, leaders of other social groups try to skirt the obstacles placed before them and use as many resources as they can garner, including those from the world arena, to expand their own autonomy. It is this context of domestic state-society relations that needs to be unraveled in order to understand the results of state leaders' efforts to reshape, ignore, or circumvent the strongest groups in their societies. We must move away from a perspective that simply pits state against society. The state is part of society, with many characteristics not very different from those of other social organizations. Officials of the state are members of the larger society. What must be sorted out is any distinctive patterns of their interactions with those in other groups and organizations.

The state is a sprawling organization within society that coexists with many other formal and informal social organizations, from families to tribes to large industrial enterprises. What distinguishes the state, at least in the modern era, is that state officials seek predominance over those myriad other organizations. That is, they aim for the state to make the binding rules guiding people's behavior or, at the very least, to authorize particular other organizations to make those rules in certain realms. By "rules" I mean the laws, regulations, decrees, and the like, which state officials indicate they are willing to enforce through the coercive means at their disposal. Rules include everything from living up to contractual commitments to driving on the right side of the road to paying alimony on

time. They involve the entire array of property rights and any of the other countless definitions of the boundaries of acceptable behavior for people.

In gauging the appropriateness of strong-state or weak-state imageries, the question of "who makes the rules" looms large. It leads us to examine the central elements of the state's domestic capabilities — whether it can get people to do what its laws and other rules prescribe, whether its policies have their intended effect on people's behavior. The following analysis in the following pages sets out the argument that social structure, particularly the existence of numerous other social organizations that exercise effective social control, has a decisive effect on the likelihood of the state's greatly expanding its capabilities. The strength of these other social organizations influences the priorities of state leaders and ultimately the ability of state agencies to enforce laws and implement policies. In the end, the argument leads to quite unanticipated conclusions: that state leaders may purposely weaken their own state agencies that could apply and enforce rules, and that the state may purposely strengthen those who apply and enforce rules in contradiction to those of the state.

Perhaps because the state's role in making and authorizing rules about public affairs and the intimacies of private life is so much taken for granted in the West, many social scientists have lost sight of the major struggle in societies with relatively new states. In many of these societies, state officials have simply not gained the right and ability to make many of the rules that they would like. Families and clans may seek to marry off children at ages quite different from the minimum age of marriage set by state law. Landlords and shopkeepers may seek interest rates for loans at variance with those legislated by the state. *The major struggles in many societies, especially those with fairly new states, are struggles over who has the right and ability to make the countless rules that guide people's social behavior.* Non-compliance here is not simply personal deviance or criminality but an indication of a more fundamental conflict over which organizations in society — the state or other organizations — should make these rules. These struggles are not over precisely which laws the state should enact or how the state's laws

or constitution should be interpreted — these, after all, are decided within *state* organs, legislatures, and courts. No, these struggles are much more fundamental, reaching beyond marginal deviance and beyond the capacities of any existing political institutions in the society. These struggles are over whether the state will be able to displace other organizations in society that make rules against the wishes and goals of state leaders.

Focusing on these struggles within society, between states and other social organizations such as clans, tribes, language groups, and the like, will give new insights into the processes of social and political change, for the very purposes for which leaders employ the state — seeking predominance through binding rules — automatically thrust it into conflict with other organizations over who has the right and ability to make those rules. Many of the existing approaches to understanding social and political change in the third world either have downplayed conflict altogether (e.g., much of “modernization” theory), or have missed these particular sorts of conflicts, which only on occasion are class based (e.g., much of the Marxist literature), or have skipped the important dynamics within domestic society altogether (e.g., dependency and world system theories).

As we shall see shortly, it is far from inevitable that state leaders will achieve predominance for the state. In cases where it is unattainable, at least for the time being, the state does not simply disappear nor does it always continually incur the high costs of battling those who are effectively making the rules in this realm or that, in one locality or another. The most subtle and fascinating patterns of political change and political inertia come in accommodations between states and other powerful organizations in society — accommodations that could not be predicted simply by assuming the autonomy of the state or the determining influences of world forces. The struggle over the state's desire for predominance, the accommodations between states and others, and the maneuvering to gain as best a deal as possible in any arrived-at accommodation are the *real* politics of many third-world societies — politics that often take place far from the capital

city. These processes can help give a clearer portrait of the state, especially by examining what happens to public policies upon their implementation in the far corners of society, a question rarely asked in the vast literature on postcolonial societies.

Public policy entails the attempt by state leaders to use their organization to make new rules and consequently change the behavior of the public. Sometimes public policy aims for modification of behavior of only a minute fraction of the population as, for instance, in certain banking regulations. Of course, in cases of policies directed toward large portions of the population, these policy efforts by state leaders represent massive undertakings, often involving the movement of significant resources through the state apparatus and into the society. Not only is the scope of the effort wide, but also such attempts broadly challenge the existing rules in society and, with them, the social organizations that enforce those rules and the leaders of those organizations who benefit most from them. On the one hand, resistance of one sort or another is nearly inevitable. Such resistance will come in states with relatively modest policy agendas, such as bringing new public health measures to villages, as well as ones with much more radical goals, such as changing places on the status ladder for entire social classes. On the other hand, the resources that come with the policy are prime targets to be used as a basis for accommodation — in ways very different from what was anticipated by state officials in the capital city who drafted the policy.

For state leaders, gaining the upper hand in the struggle engendered by initiation of new policies and the challenge to existing rules depends only partially on creating state agencies that can apply fearsome sanctions against the leaders of those other social organizations and their followers. Just as important is the need for state personnel to wean the population from such organizations and their rules by supplying the rewards that have linked people to those organizations and their leaders in the first place. Even better for state leaders would be to undermine those other organizations and the efficacy of their rules by supplying a mix of rewards, sanctions, and symbols to people that constitutes a more attractive overall

strategy of survival than that available through the old social organizations.

In talking about the formulation of conflicting strategies of survival by states and other social organizations, I run the risk of making the ground-level struggles in the third world sound as if they hinge on voluntaristic impulses. Needless to say, vulnerable workers and peasants are not simply shoppers in a "strategy" or "rules" supermarket. It is important, nevertheless, to portray the structural dimensions of the environment in which policy is implemented. New policies are not implemented in a vacuum. They almost certainly generate opposition by those with a stake in the status quo. The conflict over who makes the rules is not decided simply by force, but also by other incentives. It is here that policies are thrust into the state's struggle for predominance.

Fashioning effective strategies of survival demands that state leaders build elaborate institutions to implement their policies. The image of the strong state found in the social science literature stems in great part from the rapid expansion of the state organization in Latin America, Asia, and Africa during the last generation, as state leaders have set out to offer viable strategies to the populace and win people over to the state's rules. But one must be extremely cautious before equating a growing state apparatus with state predominance. The bureaus of the state may become little more than arenas for accommodations with other organizations.

The literature on the third world has paid scant attention to existing rule-making organizations outside the domain of the state. Yet, strategies offered to people through these structures — the organizations in conflict with the aims of state leaders and having their own rules — may be quite complex and binding.¹³ During the last century, there has been a tremendous upsurge in the strength of many such organizations. In a large number of cases, colonial divide-and-rule policies injected vast new resources — most notably, wealth and force — that enabled local and regional leaders to strengthen the strategies of survival they could offer clients and followers. In turn, their ability to make and enforce binding rules of behavior also increased. Even where there was no direct co-

lonialism, the expanding world economy funneled resources into societies quite selectively allowing for the strengthening of *cariques, effendis, caudillos*, landlords, kulak-type rich peasants, moneylenders, and others. Through credit, access to land and water, protection, bullying, and numerous other means, these leaders or strongmen (for want of a better general term) fashioned viable strategies of survival for numerous peasants and workers.

Although their rules and systems of justice have been quite different from the state's (and, often, from one another's), these strongmen have, nonetheless, enforced those rules and thus ensured a modicum of social stability — if not the same social justice state leaders would like. Challenging these leaders and their organizations, then, threatens social stability unless viable strategies of survival offered by state agencies or organizations allied with the state, such as a political party, are at hand, ready to be substituted. The fear of instability should be a strong motivation for state leaders to build as effective a set of agencies as possible.

There are certainly other inducements as well. When state policy is effectively establishing the rules of behavior, for example, state agencies can better mobilize material resources through tax collection and reorganization of production. "Much of what is traditionally meant by power," writes Lam-born, *does* involve the government's capacity to mobilize resources.¹⁵ Not only are state revenues enhanced for domestic purposes, but some of the severe pressures on state leaders from the international economy stemming from deficits in balance of payments and debt repayment can be alleviated. In short, building strong states, ones able to set the rules in their societies, is not simply an abstract norm for state leaders; there are clear imperatives coming from within and outside the society to build as strong an apparatus as possible.

State leaders, however, are caught between Scylla and Charybdis, facing a baffling paradox. If domestic and international dangers can be countered through the building of agencies of the state (which, in turn, can offer effective rules and viable strategies of survival to the population), strengthening those state institutions may at the same time hold out its own perils

for state leaders. Agencies of the state — especially those that employ violence, such as the army, but others as well — may themselves pose threats to state leaders who still have only limited ability to marshal widespread public support and resources on their own behalf. The problem is that as long as strongmen continue to offer viable strategies of survival to those of their villages, ethnic groups, etc., there are no channels for state leaders to marshal public support and there is little motivation for the population to lend such support. In other words, state leaders need a set of strong state agencies to be able to make their own strategy of survival acceptable to the peasants and laborers of the third world. They also need, however, to be able to mobilize support of these peasants and workers so that these same state agencies will not themselves overthrow state rulers through an army coup or other similar means. Such political mobilization — and here is the catch — cannot be realized without already having channels to the population, inducing mobilization through a viable mix of rewards, sanctions, and symbols — precisely what strong state agencies are needed for in the first place.¹⁶ This paradox is the dilemma of state leaders.

Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser faced this dilemma squarely during the 1950s and 1960s. Bold and extensive land reform measures, begun in the 1950s, had eliminated the class of landowners with huge holdings. Building state agencies to substitute for the policing, lending, marketing, peacekeeping, and other functions that the large landowners had overseen, however, was a painstaking process. Nasser and his cohorts fell back on middle peasants (those with holdings large enough so that members of their household need not seek work outside the farm) and rich peasants (those whose holdings were big enough to demand extra hired labor on a regular basis) to perform these functions. Some of these rich and middle peasants had played similar roles in earlier years as agents for the owners of large estates. At the same time, Nasser pushed ahead in building state agencies and a single political party. By the mid-1960s, the agencies challenged the strongmen on which the regime had needed to rely, the middle and rich peasants who had spun out their own strategies of survival

for Egypt's vast number of land-poor and landless peasants. Party cadres branded the middle and rich peasants as "feudal" elements.

Nasser's own organizations, however, began to concern him. By the early 1960s, Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amir had built an officer corps loyal to him, and he withstood attempts by Nasser to bring him under presidential control. To counter Amir's threatening power, Nasser moved in the middle 1960s to build up the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as the party that could serve as a civilian counter to the military.¹⁷ But, by the late 1960s, even the ASU was a cause for worry. It had clearly moved beyond challenging other social organizations with their "feudal" rules to challenge Nasser's own power within the state. In the end, Nasser attempted to neutralize the ASU itself, going so far as to arrest its powerful first secretary, Ali Sabri, for smuggling. In the countryside, the ASU's Committee of the Liquidation of Feudalism slipped quietly into oblivion. The rich and middle peasants, although a bit worse for wear, remained the most powerful forces in rural Egypt. The Egyptian state had not achieved predominance in large part because its ruler feared his own agencies, the army and the ASU, which were needed to achieve that predominance.

The dilemma of state leaders — this paradox of fearing and undermining the very mechanisms they need in order to reach their own goals — has reverberated throughout the third world. The degree to which this dilemma has hamstringing state leaders in appropriating power — in having their rules apply throughout the country — has varied from country to country. Where strongmen have been able to maintain tight grips on local resources, state mobilization of the population has been all the more difficult, and the dilemma of state leaders has been acute. On the other hand, where strongmen have been weakened in their control, more opportunities have existed for penetration of state authority. Nasser, for example, did have to his credit the destruction of the most powerful class in rural Egypt. The large landlords had become vulnerable as they moved from the countryside, leaving charge of their affairs to local agents, often rich and middle peasants.

The opening that absentee ownership gave Nasser allowed him to build a regime that has now lasted for more than a generation and to penetrate every village in Egypt through a number of state agencies. The hold of the rich and middle peasants, however, forced unanticipated accommodations (of a sort we shall discuss later) between them and state officials.

Elsewhere, I discuss at some length the causes of variation in state strength from country to country.¹⁶ Briefly, the rapid and deep extension of the world market from the late 1850s through World War I made many of the existing rules in Asian, African, and Latin American societies irrelevant. Colonial administration, in many areas, further undermined the control of strongmen. It was as if a great wind swept through the non-Western world, knocking Humpty Dumpty off the wall. Where colonial rule took hold, Western administrators deeply influenced how Humpty Dumpty was put together again. In some instances, centralizing indigenous groups were promoted. Far more frequently, however, colonial resources were used to reestablish fragmented social control through the promotion of old and new strongmen. Other factors could also influence the hold of strongmen. For example, devastating wars could lead to the flight of landlords and to changing man-land ratios, greatly diminishing the existing social control of strongmen.

The differences in the relative control of the state and other social organizations professing other rules are substantial from country to country. Nonetheless, many third-world countries in the postwar era have witnessed a remarkable further strengthening of local organizations and their strongmen, leaders with rules and agendas in contradiction to those professed by state leaders. The middle and rich peasants of Egypt's 4,000 villages have counterparts in many societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Far from being anachronistic relics, such strongmen and their organizations have often thrived during the last generation.

As we shall see, the increased strength of these strongmen contains an ironic note, drawing in many instances from their accommodations with the state itself. Strongmen have carved out protective niches for themselves — invigorated, as it were,

by the dilemma of state leaders. In countries where such strongmen have thrived, the dilemma of state leaders has affected the character of the state organization itself. At the apex of the state organization, at the level of the administrative implementor, and at the level of local politics, many states have been deeply influenced by the actions of state leaders who have perceived the dangers in building state agencies and unleashing them against strongmen, who promote different rules and loyalties.

AT THE APEX: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL

The ability to mobilize broad segments of the population through political parties and state agencies has eluded many leaders in the third world. Sustained political mobilization demands much more than exhortations, charisma, or ideology, especially where there are fierce battles for loyalty and conflicts over who sets the rules of daily behavior. Mobilization entails conveying to people that the routines, symbols, and ways of behaving represented by the state leadership are essential to their well-being. And it involves providing them with channels to express their support. Without a sense of urgency among broad segments of the population about the dangers of upsetting the routines established by the state and without adequate channels to sustain support, state leaders are forced to fall back on much narrower bases than those provided by mass mobilization — bases such as their organizational prowess and the support of specific social groupings. But because these bases are narrower, they make the position of state leaders precarious, especially in the face of any other significant concentrations of power in the society, which ultimately might be used against them.

Political mobilization is an effective tool for state leaders, then, when there are multitudes of channels of support. No single state agency can provide so much of that support that it can affect the overall amount appreciably. Where such a condition does not hold and a few agencies dominate — a sort of oligopoly of mobilizational capability — the very coherence of the state is diminished. Since the state's leadership in such countries has a limited reservoir of structured support to draw upon, it finds it difficult to check the centrifugal forces that

ASSETS

Journal of Management Education 30(6)