International relations as an academic discipline is a product of the twentieth century. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that political philosophers traditionally focused more on the principles and practices of governance within political units than on the relationships among these units. Even Thomas Hobbes, whose characterizations of the relations between sovereigns have given rise to the dominant school of thought about international relations, devoted only a few pages to international political philosophy, focusing far more on the role of the state or the Leviathan in establishing order and stability within domestic society. To argue this point, however, is not to deny the importance of the philosophical writings that did deal with relations among independent political entities, whether city-states, feudal baronies, or states. The works of Grotius, Rousseau, Clausewitz, and Kant, for example, offer immense insights into various aspects of these relationships, as do the few pages by Hobbes that deal with the interaction of sovereigns. Moreover, although these insights reflect the observations of specific individuals rather than the collective output of an academic discipline, they are both timeless and profound. Not surprisingly, therefore, they also provide much of the basis for the various intellectual traditions underpinning the contemporary study of international relations. These intellectual traditions include: (1) liberal institutionalism, which has several diverse strands of origin; (2) Hobbesian realism and its contemporary variant of neo-realism; and (3) Marxist and neo-Marxist thinking, which were crucial both to Cold War revisionism and to the development of dependency theory. Each of these is reflected in pertinent selections in this section.

**LIBERAL THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

One of the strands in liberal thinking about international relations—what might be termed the legalistic—can be traced back to the work of Hugo Grotius and his contention that there is a society of states bound by common rules, customs, and shared norms. Based on the outset on natural law thinking, this strand of thought is represented here by a selection from the famous work by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), *The Rights of War and Peace Including the Law of Nature and of Nations*. This volume provided the basis for international law in the European state system. Indeed, Grotius has been widely considered the key figure in the development of international jurisprudence and been described as the father of international law. Using natural law as his starting point, Grotius emphasized that there was a law of war as well as a law of peace. In the selection included here, he distinguishes between public and private war and also discusses the nature of sovereign power.

A second strand of liberal thinking is represented by the work of Immanuel Kant. Although some of Kant's ideas contributed enormously to the notion of global cosmopolitanism, which is currently manifested in ideas about global civil society, he also provided many of the intellectual antecedents for contemporary liberal institutionalism as well as a series of propositions that are currently articulated in the idea of the liberal peace—the notion that liberal democratic states, if not inherently pacifist, are very unlikely to fight other liberal democracies. Rather than going directly to the body of Kant's work, however, we thought it more useful to provide excerpts from the work of Michael Doyle, one of the major democratic peace theorists, whose commentaries on Kant are far more accessible than Kant's own philosophic writings. Doyle provides an incisive commentary on Kant's First, Second, and Third Definative Articles: The First Article requires that states have a republican constitution, representative government, and juridical freedom. The Second Article covers the creation and expansion of a federation of free states, and the Third seeks to establish what Doyle describes as "a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union." The end state envisaged by Kant is a state of perpetual peace.

Although much of the liberal tradition was initially based on perceptive insights into the nature of behavior of sovereigns, the liberal tradition became much more divorced from the actual behavior of states during the period between World War I and II. It is little exaggeration to suggest, in fact, that this tradition was hijacked by a kind of idealism presupposing that international relations could be fundamentally transformed so long as the right formulation was found. The idealists of this period, particularly in Great Britain and the United States, believed drastic change was crucial to avoiding war. This was a direct response to World War I, which also provided the main stimulus to the development of the discipline of international relations. The slaughter on the Western Front resulted in a "never again" philosophy reflected in the emergence of idealism as the dominant approach to international relations, especially in Great Britain.

Consequently, interwar studies of international relations were predominantly prescriptive pieces aiming to reform the international system and ensure that further destructive wars were avoided. These ideas were enshrined in Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" (which is reproduced here), and in the philosophy, structure, and organization of the League of Nations. They were developed particularly fully in Great Britain and the United States. Enjoying the luxury of relative security provided by the English Channel in one case and by the Atlantic Ocean in the other, British and American thinkers could offer prescriptions for reform of the international system that were far less compelling for states surrounded by potential enemies.¹

¹ This is discussed more fully in Arnold Wolfers, *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1936).
The starting point for many liberals and idealists was the Enlightenment notion that human society could be perfected. This had important implications for assessing why war occurred and what needed to be done to prevent it. Many liberals and idealists saw war stemming not from human nature but from imperfect political institutions that an advancing civilization could eliminate. They also assumed that a natural harmony of interests existed among peoples but that this harmony was disrupted by imperfect arrangements and practices—at both the national and international levels. The crucial task, therefore, was to identify the causes of war and to eradicate them. Many analysts saw the main causes of World War I as international anarchy and the balance of power. Others saw the prime cause as the arms race; yet others emphasized secret diplomacy. The prescriptions followed the diagnoses: international anarchy should be replaced by international organization, with the League of Nations playing the primary role in ensuring the rule of law; arms races would be prevented by general disarmament; and secret diplomacy was to be replaced by public diplomacy and democratic control—a notion that can be traced back directly to Kant’s First Definitive Article.

There were, of course, differences of emphasis. Some liberals and idealists focused on reform of the international system, whereas others wanted to start with reform at the state level. Members of this latter group believed that democracies were inherently less aggressive and less likely to go to war than authoritarian states. This belief was perhaps best reflected in Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” and still finds many echoes in much contemporary thinking. During the 1990s, arguments about the promotion of democratic forms of government in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were based on the fear that the alternative to democracy was a re-emergence of ultra-nationalist regimes that would pursue aggressive and expansionist foreign policies. More recently, the United States’ intervention in Iraq was justified, in part at least, in terms of the need to replace authoritarian leadership in the Middle East with liberal democracies. The liberal argument—which, ironically, was embraced by many conservatives and neo-conservatives in the Bush administration prior to U.S. military action in Iraq—is that creating democracy in the country will have a domino effect throughout the region, and that the spread of democracy in turn will greatly increase the opportunities for peace and stability.

In effect, this reflects the sheer persistence of one of the major characteristics of the liberal tradition—a faith in reform. The idealists who emerged after World War I believed that they had the solutions to the problems of international politics and war; their only remaining task was to educate governments and peoples so that they would carry out the actions necessary to achieve those solutions. The problem was that much of this approach was characterized by wishful thinking rather than a hard-headed appraisal of the possibilities for reform and the obstacles that would have to be overcome if it was to succeed.

If the idealists of the interwar period were in the Kantian and Grotian tradition, they allowed their desire to transform international relations to hinder their understanding of state practice. Their aspirations for reform encountered two main difficulties. The first was that similar sentiments were not fully shared by the states of Continental Europe, which did not have the English Channel or the Atlantic Ocean to protect them from security threats—and were therefore reluctant to put their faith in new and untried institutions as opposed to their own efforts to enhance their security and power. The second and closely related problem was that the arguments for reform of the international system presumed that all major states in the system saw peace and security as their main goal. This was a particularly inappropriate assumption in the 1930s, with the emergence of Fascist dictatorships that pursued policies of internal terror and external expansion—a development that should have raised immediate red flags for liberals who, following Kant, emphasized the pacific nature of democracies and the aggressive nature of other forms of government. The aggressions of Nazi Germany and Japan underlined the fact that, as Henry Kissinger subsequently noted, when peace becomes the primary goal of most states in the international system, the system itself is soon at the mercy of its most ruthless members.²

Although the idealists’ remoteness from the harsh realities of international relations in the 1930s discredited some of the ideas about international institutions and the rule of law, the Grotian component of the liberal tradition has been revitalized in the writings of Hedley Bull. One of the foremost authorities on nuclear arms control and at one point the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the British Foreign Office, Bull approached contemporary problems within a framework of traditional philosophy. Although he placed himself within the Grotian tradition, however, Bull was careful to differentiate his position from that of the idealists of the interwar period. He was very critical of what he termed the “twentieth century emphasis upon ideas of a reformed or improved international society, as distinct from the elements of society in actual practice” arguing that this has “led to a treatment of the League of Nations, the United Nations and other general international organizations as the chief institutions of international society, to the neglect of those institutions whose role in the maintenance of international order is the central one.”³ Bull believed that “the Wilsonian rejection of the balance of power” and “the denigration of diplomacy” were particularly unfortunate as both the balance of power and diplomacy are crucial to maintaining order in the international system.⁴

A compelling component of Bull’s approach to international relations was his recognition that relations among states were, in many respects, anarchical, but that there were nonetheless elements of society in the international system. In his desire not to claim too much for the notion of international

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philosophers to emphasize the use of force to obtain desired objectives. He was also concerned with amassing, maintaining, and using power—and offered explicit advice to rulers about how best to do all this. Machiavelli’s *The Prince* (1532) emphasized the need to acquire skill in warfare. It also displayed a real appreciation of the role of power—understood as the capacity to make someone do something he would not otherwise do—which is best exemplified in Machiavelli’s comment that “there is simply no comparison between a man who is armed and one who is not. It is unreasonable to expect that an armed man should obey one who is not or that an unarmed man should remain safe and secure when his servants are armed.” A similar kind of thinking was evident in Machiavelli’s advice to princes that they should endeavor to be feared rather than loved, that they should honor their word only when it does not place them at a disadvantage, and that they should appear to have many virtuous qualities even when they do not. What counts, Machiavelli argued, was the result.

Machiavelli developed an appreciation for the role of power in political life, and the same sense is evident in the writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), one of the great English philosophers and political theorists of the seventeenth century. Hobbes shares with Machiavelli a pessimism about human nature. Yet perhaps Hobbes’s most important contribution to thinking about international politics, and the one contained here from *Leviathan* (1651), was his contrast between relations among persons in a society controlled by the state (or “Leviathan”) and the relations among persons, and more particularly sovereigns, where no Leviathan exists to maintain order. For Hobbes, the relationship among kings or persons in sovereign authority is akin to that in the state of nature (before the formation of the state) in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” As he contends, sovereigns are in a state of continual jealousies and in the posture of gladiators with their weapons pointing toward one another. This comment illustrates perhaps better than any other single statement the suspicion and sense of insecurity characterizing the relations among states in a system without a central overriding authority.

The analyses of Machiavelli and Hobbes provide the intellectual antecedents for the development of realism. However, as mentioned above, the main stimulus to the rise of contemporary realism came out of a sense of frustration with the idealism of the interwar period. Although World War II was to provide the death knell for the naive idealism of the 1920s and 1930s, British historian E. H. Carr contributed to the demise of idealism in his book *The Twenty Years Crisis*. Carr offered an important and devastating critique of untempered idealist thinking, part of which is reproduced in this section. Although Carr was not wholly uncritical of realism either, he argued that notions of the harmony of interest—fundamental to idealism—were simply a disguise for the vested interests of the predominant powers and their desire to maintain the status quo.

If Carr pointed the way to the realist tradition, this tradition was perhaps best exemplified by the father of the realist school and one of the most influential
analysts in international relations, Hans Morgenthau, who taught for many years at the University of Chicago. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* was an immensely important study that influenced successive generations of scholars and analysts and, occasionally, national decision makers. During the early 1970s, in particular, the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, was based on considerations of realpolitik and geopolitics of the kind emphasized by Morgenthau. Indeed, Morgenthau started from the premise that international politics, like all politics, was a struggle for power and that states defined their national interest in terms of power. His basic thesis is enshrined in his famous statement of the principles of political realism, reprinted here. A careful reading of this excerpt will illustrate Morgenthau’s view of human nature as essentially unchanging and as exhibiting a lust for power; his emphasis on rational choice by statesmen, accompanied by a dismissive attitude toward motives other than the search for power; his assessment of the central importance of the balance of power; his contention that politics is a distinct and autonomous sphere of action; and his desire to establish a theory of international politics.

Critics were not slow to point out the shortcomings of *Politics Among Nations*. They argued that Morgenthau relied too heavily for his starting point on a concept of human nature that was very elusive, that his core concepts such as power and interest were vague and ill-defined, and that it was not clear whether he had developed a prescriptive or a descriptive theory. They also noted inconsistencies between Morgenthau’s contention that state behavior could be understood as the pursuit of interests defined in terms of power and his criticisms of U.S. foreign policymakers for acting according to ideological principles rather than according to the principles he had set forth as the basic determinants of behavior. This ambivalence about whether he was being descriptive or prescriptive, however, did not prevent Morgenthau from having a major impact.

Although many subsequent analysts rejected key parts of Morgenthau’s analysis, his idea of international politics as a struggle for power became the basis for much later theorizing. Robert Keohane, one of the first analysts to write about the growing trend toward the interdependence of states and a trenchant critic of Morgenthau, has pointed out that even many of those who followed in the tradition of power politics did not share all of Morgenthau’s assumptions. Perhaps the most important difference was that subsequent theorists focused less on the inherent lust for power and more on the anarchical nature of the international system as a basic determinant of international political behavior.

This view was most evident in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, who placed unprecedented emphasis on the structure of the system, a term that Waltz used to cover both anarchy (in the sense that a central overriding authority was absent) and the distribution of power or capabilities within the system. Waltz argues that the distribution of power or the size of the international hierarchy has crucial implications for the stability of the system and is the key to theorizing about international politics. This provided the basis for what is generally described as structural realism or neo-realism. The selection by Waltz included in this section is valuable because it summarizes the main elements of the neo-realist approach to international politics and also because Waltz differentiates his approach from the realism of Morgenthau. One of these crucial differences is that, whereas Morgenthau sees states as striving for power, Waltz sees them as searching for security. States in Morgenthau’s world are driven by ambition; those in Waltz’s world are motivated by fear about the possible ambitions of others.

One of the ways in which Waltz’s work does resemble that of Morgenthau, however, is in the criticism it has attracted. Critics have claimed that neo-realism is far too deterministic, that it cannot predict change in the international system, and that Waltz, like Morgenthau, disregards the internal attributes of states. Yet others contend that by emphasizing the autonomy of international politics, Waltz overlooks or dismisses crucial elements of the international system such as economic processes, international political institutions, and growing interdependence among states.

One criticism perhaps not made often enough, however, is that Waltz conflates several distinct aspects of the international system under the term structure. International anarchy, which is a key element in his thinking, is better described in terms of the nature of the system rather than its structure. The lack of a central overriding authority and the fact that states consequently have to rely on self-help for security are permanent features of international politics and characteristics that endure, whatever the precise distribution of power in the system. A world containing two great powers and a world containing many great powers are very different in structural terms; yet, in terms of the anarchical nature of the system, they are essentially the same. In both systems, insecurity is endemic—although there are likely to be major differences in terms of who is afraid of whom and why. In other words, although patterns of insecurity will differ along with variations in the distribution of power, insecurity is pervasive and endemic. To the extent that this is accepted—and Waltz himself argues that anarchy is unchanging whereas the distribution of power among the units and the number of great powers vary greatly—the notion of structure should be used to refer only to the distribution of power within the system and not to international anarchy, which is best conceived and understood in terms of the essential and irreducible nature of the system.

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7 These criticisms are developed more fully in many of the selections in Keohane, *Neo-realism and Its Critics*. 
The Roots of International Political Economy

One of the most obvious alternatives to Waltz's approach or to realist theories in general is the economic approach, encompassing, but not confined to, Marxist and neo-Marxist theories. Radical and neo-Marxist theories not only offer alternative explanations for the outbreak of war from those offered by neo-realism but also focus on inequality or underdevelopment, which are ignored in more traditional, state-centric approaches. Marxist approaches to international relations are characterized by an emphasis not so much on state conflict as on class conflict. The crucial divisions are not those between states but those between the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed within societies and between them. And where conflict arises among states, this occurs because these states embody particular kinds of economic structures and ideologies.

For Karl Marx (1818–1883), history was not about the rise and fall of nations or about patterns of security and cooperation among states; rather, it was about societies' changing system of economic production, which determined the ownership of wealth. Marx developed a theory of history based on the dialectics of the class struggle. His writings traced the transition from feudalism to capitalism and predicted the transition from capitalism to socialism—a development he saw as preordained by the weaknesses or contradictions of capitalism. The rise of capitalism itself was inextricably bound up with the rise of the bourgeoisie, or new capitalists. The bourgeoisie controlled the means of production in society and exploited the workers, or proletariat, who were the actual producers but benefited very little from the results of their labor. By selling products for much more than was paid to the workers, the capitalists were able to accrue even more wealth. Profit widened the gap between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Marx argued, however, that this system contained the seeds of its own destruction—that the alienation of the proletariat would lead eventually to revolution and the replacement of the capitalist system by a socialist system. He provided a theory of history and of revolution rather than a theory of international relations. Yet those who either followed in the intellectual tradition he established or were influenced by it (even though they rejected some of its precepts) were to develop Marxist ideas in ways that helped to explain crucial aspects of state behavior and some characteristics of the international system.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one of the most obvious aspects of great power behavior was overseas expansion. The European states engaged in a "scramble for Africa," and even the United States became involved in Asia, taking control of the Philippines. Like other imperialist powers, the United States provided a self-serving rationale that explained imperialism in terms of honor and duty. The Leninist view, however, characterized imperialism as exploitative and as leading to war between the capitalist powers. Lenin's interpretation built not only on Marx but also on the writings of John Hobson (1858–1940), an English non-Marxist economist who went to the Boer War as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian and whose work *Imperialism: A Study* (1902) was crucial in changing attitudes toward imperialism.

Hobson was one of the first commentators to point to the exploitative nature of imperialism. The basis of his argument was that, in the capitalist system, those who had surplus capital preferred to invest it abroad rather than to redistribute it at home. They sought "to broaden the channel for the flow of their surplus wealth by seeking foreign markets and foreign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use at home." In Hobson's view, financial interests were the dynamic force in imperial expansion and manipulated the other forces of society for their economic ends. This emerges very clearly in the excerpt from Hobson contained here.

This emphasis on economic motivations provided the basis for the Leninist interpretation, which saw imperialism as the highest form of capitalism and argued that war between imperialist powers was inevitable. Indeed, Lenin's greatest contribution to the neo-Marxist tradition may be this linkage between imperialism and war. For Lenin, imperialist policies were a means of staving off domestic revolution. The problem for the capitalist states, however, was that both markets and raw materials were finite. Consequently, conflict among them was inevitable—hence World War I.

An interesting point of similarity between neo-Marxism and neo-realism is an emphasis on international conflict. Moreover, although the explanations for conflict are very different, both approaches see the roots of conflict in terms of system characteristics: neo-Marxists emphasize the nature and structure of capitalist economic systems; neo-realists the nature and structure of the international system. In other respects, however, radical or neo-Marxist approaches are very distinctive. In neo-Marxist thinking, for example, the state has a very different role than is attributed to it in either of the other traditions outlined above: The state is important primarily as a reflection of underlying economic forces. Conversely, the horizontal linkages that cut across states are reflected in such notions as international class solidarity highlight the limits of a state-centric approach. Indeed, the focus on horizontal linkages in neo-Marxist thinking gives it something in common with contemporary proponents of international society who emphasize the growing interdependence among states.

One of the most important elements differentiating the two approaches, however, is that neo-Marxism also focuses on horizontal divisions and the asymmetric nature of economic relationships: The key theme is not so much

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interdependence as dependence—and exploitation. Some of these differences emerge more forcefully from a careful reading of the piece by Stephen Krasner, a non-Marxist scholar who has done important work on the economic dimensions of U.S. foreign policy. In the selection we have chosen, Krasner identifies some of the ways in which Marxism differs from other approaches to international politics and distinguishes between what he calls instrumental and structural Marxists. The article by Theotonio Dos Santos elaborates on the notion of economic dependence, identifying three different forms such dependence takes and elucidating the ways in which dependence is perpetuated.

Despite some apparent similarities or points of convergence, therefore, the fundamental nature of the differences among the three perspectives—Hobbesian realism; the Kantian and Grotian emphasis on an international society of liberal democracies; and the neo-Marxist emphasis on inequality, exploitation, and dependence—needs to be understood. Indeed, these differences of approach are woven throughout this volume, the better to illustrate our challenging yet fascinating discipline.

Understanding international relations is a massive and complex undertaking, and diversity of approach and scholarship can illuminate its many facets. International relations involves conflict and cooperation, anarchy and society, independence, interdependence, and dependence. All are different elements of a complex reality that poses formidable problems of analysis and understanding but is also one of the most distinctive and engaging areas of human activity.

I

HUGO GROTlUS

THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE

THE DIVISION OF WAR INTO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AND THE NATURE OF SOVEREIGN POWER

I. The first and most necessary divisions of war are into one kind called private, another public, and another mixed. Now public war is carried on by the person holding the sovereign power. Private war is that which is carried by private persons without authority from the state. A mixed war is that which is carried

on, on one side by public authority, and on the other by private persons. But private war, from its greater antiquity, is the first subject for inquiry.

The proofs that have been already produced, to show that to repel violence is not repugnant to natural law, afford a satisfactory reason to justify private war, as far as the law of nature is concerned, but perhaps it may be thought that since public tribunals have been erected, private redress of wrongs is not allowable. An objection which is very just. Yet although public trials and courts of justice are not institutions of nature, but erected by the invention of men, yet as it is much more conducive to the peace of society for a matter in dispute to be decided by a disinterested person, than by the partiality and prejudice of the party aggrieved, natural justice and reason will dictate the necessity and advantage of every one's submitting to the equitable decisions of public judges. Paulus, the Lawyer, observes that "what can be done by a magistrate with the authority of the state, should never be intrusted to individuals; as private redress would give rise to greater disturbance." And "the reason, says King Theodoric, why laws were invented, was to prevent any one from using personal violence, for wherein would peace differ from all the confusion of war, if private disputes were terminated by force?" And the law calls it force for any man to seize what he thinks his due, without seeking a legal remedy.

II. It is a matter beyond all doubt that the liberty of private redress, which once existed, was greatly abridged after courts of justice were established. Yet there may be cases, in which private redress must be allowed, as for instance, if the way to legal justice were not open. For when the law prohibits any one from redressing his own wrongs, it can only be understood to apply to circumstances where a legal remedy exists. Now the obstruction in the way to legal redress may be either temporary or absolute. Temporary, where it is impossible for the injured party to wait for a legal remedy, without imminent danger and even destruction. As for instance, if a man were attacked in the night, or in a secret place where no assistance could be procured. Absolute, either as the right, or the fact may require. Now there are many situations, where the right must cease from the impossibility of supporting it in a legal way, as in unoccupied places, on the seas, in a wilderness, or desert island, or any other place, where there is no civil government. All legal remedy too ceases by fact, when subjects will not submit to the judge, or if he refuses openly to take cognizance of matters in dispute. The assertion that all private war is not made repugnant to the law of nature by the erection of legal tribunals, may be understood from the law given to the Jews, wherein God thus speaks by the mouth of Moses, Exod. xxii. 2. "If a thief be found breaking up, that is, by night, and be smitten that he dies, there shall no blood be shed for him, but if the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him." Now this law, making so accurate a distinction in the merits of the case, seems not only to imply impunity for killing any one, in self-defence, but to explain a natural right, founded not on any special divine command, but on the common principles of justice. From whence other nations have plainly followed

the same rule. The passage of the twelve tables is well known, undoubtedly taken from the old Athenian Law, “If a thief commit a robbery in the night, and a man kill him, he is killed lawfully.” Thus by the laws of all known and civilized nations, the person is judged innocent, who kills another, forcibly attempting or endangering his life; a conspiring and universal testimony, which proves that in justifiable homicide, there is nothing repugnant to the law of nature...

IV. Public war, according to the law of nations, is either SOLEMN, that is FORMAL, or LESS SOLEMN, that is INFORMAL. The name of lawful war is commonly given to what is here called formal, in the same sense in which a regular will is opposed to a codicil, or a lawful marriage to the cohabitation of slaves. This opposition by no means implies that it is not allowed to any man, if he pleases, to make a codicil, or to slaves to cohabit in matrimony, but only that, by the civil law, FORMAL WILLS and SOLEMN MARRIAGES, were attended with peculiar privileges and effects. These observations were the more necessary; because many, from a misconception of the word just or lawful, think that all wars, to which those epithets do not apply, are condemned as unjust and unlawful. Now to give a war the formality required by the law of nations, two things are necessary. In the first place it must be made on both sides, by the sovereign power of the state, and in the next place it must be accompanied with certain formalities. Both of which are so essential that one is insufficient without the other.

Now a public war, LESS SOLEMN, may be made without those formalities, even against private persons, and by any magistrate whatever. And indeed, considering the thing without respect to the civil law, every magistrate, in case of resistance, seems to have a right to take up arms, to maintain his authority in the execution of his office; as well as to defend the people committed to his protection. But as a whole state is by war involved in danger, it is an established law in almost all nations that no war can be made but by the authority of the sovereign in each state....

VII. That power is called sovereign, whose actions are not subject to the control of any other power, as so as to be annulled at the pleasure of any other human will. The term ANY OTHER HUMAN WILL exempts the sovereign himself from this restriction, who may annul his own acts, as may also his successor, who enjoys the same right, having the same power and no other. We are to consider then what is the subject in which this sovereign power exists. Now the subject is in one respect common, and in another proper, as the body is the common subject of sight, the eye the proper, so the common subject of sovereign power is the state, which has already been said to be a perfect society of men.

Now those nations, who are in a state of subjugation to another power, as the Roman provinces were, are excluded from this definition. For those nations are not sovereign states of themselves, in the present acceptation of the word; but are subordinate members of a great state, as slaves are members of a household.

2.

MICHAEL W. DOYLE

KANT’S PERPETUAL PEACE

LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

Modern liberalism carries with it two legacies. They do not affect liberal states separately, according to whether they are pacifistic or imperialistic, but simultaneously.

The first of these legacies is the pacification of foreign relations among liberal states. During the nineteenth century, the United States and Great Britain engaged in nearly continual strife; however, after the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual representation as the formal source of the sovereignty of the British parliament, Britain and the United States negotiated their disputes. They negotiated despite, for example, British grievances during the Civil War against the North’s blockade of the South, with which Britain had close economic ties. Despite severe Anglo-French colonial rivalry, liberal France and liberal Britain formed an entente against illiberal Germany before World War I. And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria, chose not to fulfill its obligations under that treaty to support its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alliance with Britain and France, which prevented it from having to fight other liberal states and then declared war on Germany and Austria. Despite generations of Anglo-American tension and Britain’s wartime restrictions on American trade with Germany, the United States leaned toward Britain and France from 1914 to 1917 before entering World War I on their side.

Beginning in the eighteenth century and slowly growing since then, a zone of peace, which Kant called the “pacific federation” or “pacific union,” has begun to be established among liberal societies. More than 40 liberal states currently make up the union. Most are in Europe and North America, but they can be found on every continent....

Here the predictions of liberal pacifists (and President Reagan) are borne out: liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint, and a separate peace exists among them. This separate peace provides a solid foundation for the United States’ crucial alliances with the liberal powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and our Japanese alliance. This foundation appears to be

impervious to the quarrels with our allies that bedeviled the Carter and Reagan administrations. It also offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states, and as the number of liberal states increases, it announces the possibility of global peace this side of the grave or world conquest.

Of course, the probability of the outbreak of war in any given year between any two given states is low. The occurrence of a war between any two adjacent states, considered over a long period of time, would be more probable. The apparent absence of war between liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for almost 200 years thus may have significance. Similar claims cannot be made for feudal, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for pluralistic or merely similar societies. More significant perhaps is that when states are forced to decide on which side of an impending world war they will fight, liberal states all wind up on the same side despite the complexity of the paths that take them there. These characteristics do not prove that the peace among liberals is statistically significant nor that liberalism is the sole valid explanation for the peace. They do suggest that we consider the possibility that liberals have indeed established a separate peace—but only among themselves.

Liberalism also carries with it a second legacy: international “imprudence” (Hume, 1963, pp. 346–47). Peaceful restraint only seems to work in liberals’ relations with other liberals. Liberal states have fought numerous wars with nonliberal states...

Many of these wars have been defensive and thus prudent by necessity. Liberal states have been attacked and threatened by nonliberal states. Authoritarian states often and respond to an international political environment in which conflicts of prestige, interest, and purges are the norm. The legitimacy of states that do not lead states toward war. War and conquest have thus characterized the careers of many authoritarian states. Authoritarian states include the Fascists, Hitler’s Nazis, and Stalin’s communists.

Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on the authoritarian or totalitarian states, as many of our more enthusiastic politicians would have us do. Most wars are likely to have originated out of calculations and miscalculations of interest, misunderstandings, and mutual suspicions, such as those that characterized the origins of World War I. However, aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. Both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the nineteenth century. The United States fought a war with Mexico from 1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign states many times before and after World War II. Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b).

Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist theory accounts well for these two legacies. While they can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability (Aron, 1974, pp. 151–54; Russett, 1983), neither the logic of the balance of power nor the logic of international hegemony explains the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance—liberal principles and institutions. Balance-of-power theory expects—indeed is premised upon—flexible arrangements of geopolitical rivalry that include preventive war. Hegemonies wax and wane, but the liberal peace holds. Marxist “ultra-imperialists” expect a form of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but only liberal capitalists maintain peace. Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be aggressive toward nonliberal states, but they also (and especially) expect them to be imperialist toward fellow liberal capitalists.

Kant’s theory of liberal internationalism helps us understand these two legacies. The importance of Immanuel Kant as a theorist of international ethics has been well appreciated (Armstrong, 1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap. 1; Galtung, 1973; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley, 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, 1965; Waltz, 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has an important analytical theory of international politics. Perpetual Peace, written in 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93–130), helps us understand the interactive nature of international relations. Kant tries to teach us methodologically that we can study neither the systemic relations of states nor the varieties of state behavior in isolation from each other. Substantively, he anticipates for us the ever-widening pacification of a liberal pacific union, explains this pacification, and at the same time suggests why liberal states are not pacific in their relations with nonliberal states. Kant argues that perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of three “definitive articles” of peace. When all nations have accepted the definitive articles in a metaphorical “treaty” of perpetual peace he asks them to sign, perpetual peace will have been established.

The First Definitive Article requires the civil constitution of the state to be republican. By republican Kant means a political society that has solved the problem of combining moral autonomy, individualism, and social order. A private property and market-oriented economy partially addressed this dilemma in the private sphere. The public, or political, sphere was more troubling. His answer was a republic that preserved juridical freedom—the legal equality of citizens as subjects—on the basis of a representative government with a separation of powers. Juridical freedom is preserved because the morally autonomous individual is by means of representation a self-legislator making laws that apply to all citizens equally, including himself or herself. Tyranny is avoided because the individual is subject to laws he or she does not also administer (Kant, PP, pp. 99–102; Riley, 1983, chap. 5). Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union (foedus pacificum), described in Kant’s Second Definitive Article. The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state. The world will not have achieved the “perpetual peace” that provides the ultimate guarantor of republican freedom until “a late stage and after many unsuccessful
nature visibly exhibits the purposive plan of producing concord among men, even against their will and indeed by means of their very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. 44-45). Understanding history requires an epistemological foundation, for without a teleology, such as the promise of perpetual peace, the complexity of history would overwhelm human understanding (Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetual peace, however, is not merely a heuristic device with which to interpret history. It is guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result from men fulfilling their ethical duty of, failing that, from a hidden plan. Peace is an ethical duty because it is only under conditions of peace that all men can treat each other as ends, rather than means to an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, chap. 3). In order for this duty to be practical, Kant needs, of course, to show that peace is in fact possible. The widespread sentiment of approbation that he saw aroused by the early success of the French revolutionaries showed him that we can indeed be moved by ethical sentiments with a cosmopolitan reach (Kant, CE, pp. 181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This does not mean, however, that perpetual peace is certain ("prophylactic"). Even the scientifically regular course of the planets could be changed by a wayward comet striking them out of orbit. Human freedom requires that we allow for much greater reversals in the course of history. We must, in fact, anticipate the possibility of backsliding and destructive wars—though these will serve to educate nations to the importance of peace (Kant, UH, pp. 47-48).

In the end, however, our guarantee of perpetual peace does not rest on ethical conduct. As Kant emphasizes,

we now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace. What does nature do in relation to the end which man's own reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not do) will in fact be done through nature's compulsion, without prejudice to the free agency of man? . . . This does not mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by practical reason. On the contrary, nature does it herself, whether we are willing or not: facta volenti destinat, volenti trahunt. (PP, p. 112)

The guarantee thus rests, Kant argues, not on the probable behavior of moral angels, but on that of "devils, so long as they possess understanding" (PP, p. 112). In explaining the sources of each of the three definitive articles of the perpetual peace, Kant then tells us how we (as free and intelligent devils) could be motivated by fear, force, and calculated advantage to undertake a course of action whose outcome we could reasonably anticipate to be perpetual peace. Yet while it is possible to conceive of the Kantian road to peace in these terms, Kant himself recognizes and argues that social evolution also makes the conditions of moral behavior less onerous and hence more likely (CE, pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In tracing the effects of both political and moral
Yet these domestic republican restraints do not end war. If they did, liberal states would not be warlike, which is far from the case. They do introduce republican caution—Kant's 'hesitation'—in place of monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes. The historical liberal legacy is laden with popular wars fought to promote freedom, to protect private property, or to support liberal allies against nonliberal enemies. Kant's position is ambiguous. He regards these wars as unjust and warns liberals of their susceptibility to them (Kant, PP, p. 106). At the same time, Kant argues that each nation 'can and ought' to demand that its neighboring nations enter into the pacific union of liberal states (PP, p. 102). Thus to see how the pacific union removes the occasion of wars among liberal states and not wars between liberal and nonliberal states, we need to shift our attention from constitutional law to international law, Kant's second source.

Complementing the constitutional guarantee of caution, international law adds a second source for the definitive articles: a guarantee of respect. The separation of nations that asocial sociability encourages is reinforced by the development of separate languages and religions. These further guarantee a world of separate states—an essential condition needed to avoid a 'global, soul-less despotism.' Yet, at the same time, they also morally integrate liberal states: 'as culture grows and men gradually move towards greater agreement over their principles, they lead to mutual understanding and peace' (Kant, PP, p. 114). As republics emerge (the first source) and as culture progresses, an understanding of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of all republics comes into play; and this, now that caution characterizes policy, sets up the moral foundations for the liberal peace. Correspondingly, international law highlights the importance of Kantian publicity. Domestically, publicity helps ensure that the officials of republics act according to the principles they profess to hold just and according to the interests of the electors they claim to represent. Internationally, free speech and the effective communication of accurate conceptions of the political life of foreign peoples is essential to establishing and preserving the understanding on which the guarantee of respect depends. Domestically just republics, which rest on consent, then presume foreign republics also to be consensual, just, and therefore deserving of accommodation. The experience of cooperation helps engender further cooperative behavior when the consequences of state policy are unclear but (potentially) mutually beneficial. At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become for liberal governments deeply suspect. In short, fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate; each, however, may also be self-confirming.

Lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material incentives to moral commitments. The cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits the 'spirit of commerce' sooner or later to take hold of every nation, thus impelling states to promote peace and
to try to avert war. Liberal economic theory holds that these cosmopolitan ties derive from a cooperative international division of labor and free trade according to comparative advantage. Each economy is said to be better off than it would have been under autarky; each thus acquires an incentive to avoid policies that would lead the other to break these economic ties. Because keeping open markets rests upon the assumption that the next set of transactions will also be determined by prices rather than coercion, a sense of mutual security is vital to avoid security-motivated searches for economic autarky. Thus, avoiding a challenge to another liberal state's security or even enhancing each other's security by means of alliance naturally follows economic interdependence.

A further cosmopolitan source of liberal peace is the international market's removal of difficult decisions of production and distribution from the direct sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus does not appear directly responsible for these outcomes, and states can stand aside from, and to some degree above, these contentious market rivalries and be ready to step in to resolve crises. The interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of state officials help create crosscutting transnational ties that serve as lobbies for mutual accommodation. According to modern liberal scholars, international financiers and transnational and transgovernmental organizations create interests in favor of accommodation. Moreover, their variety has ensured that no single conflict sours an entire relationship by setting off a spiral of reciprocated retaliation (Brezinski and Huntington, 1963, chap. 9; Keohane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt, 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1-2). Conversely, a sense of suspicion, such as that characterizing relations between liberal and nonliberal governments, can lead to restrictions on the range of contacts between societies, and this can increase the prospect that a single conflict will determine an entire relationship.

No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but together (and only together) they plausibly connect the characteristics of liberal politics and economies with sustained liberal peace. Alliances founded on mutual strategic interest among liberal and nonliberal states have been broken; economic ties between liberal and nonliberal states have proven fragile; but the political bonds of liberal rights and interests have proven a remarkably firm foundation for mutual nonaggression. A separate peace exists among liberal states.

In their relations with nonliberal states, however, liberal states have not escaped from the insecurity caused by anarchy in the world political system considered as a whole. Moreover, the very constitutional restraint, international respect for individual rights, and shared commercial interests that establish grounds for peace among liberal states establish grounds for additional conflict in relations between liberal and nonliberal societies.

CONCLUSION

Kant's liberal internationalism, Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and Schumpeter's liberal pacifism rest on fundamentally different views of the nature of the human being, the state, and international relations. Schumpeter's humans are rationalized, individualized, and democratized. They are also homogenized, pursuing material interests "monistically." Because their material interests lie in peaceful trade, they and the democratic state that these fellow citizens control are pacificist. Machiavelli's citizens are splendidly diverse in their goals but fundamentally unequal in them as well, seeking to rule or being dominated. Extending the rule of the dominant elite or avoiding the political collapse of their state, each calls for imperial expansion.

Kant's citizens, too, are diverse in their goals and individualized and rationalized, but most importantly, they are capable of appreciating the moral equality of all individuals and of treating other individuals as ends rather than as means. The Kantian state thus is governed publicly according to law, as a republic. Kant's is the state that solves the problem of governing individualized equals, whether they are the "rational devils" he says we often find ourselves to be or the ethical agents we can and should become. Republics tell us that

in order to organize a group of rational beings who together require universal laws for their survival, but of whom each separate individual is secretly inclined to exempt himself from them, the constitution must be so designed so that, although the citizens are opposed to one another in their private attitudes, these opposing views may inhibit one another in such a way that the public conduct of the citizens will be the same as if they did not have such evil attitudes. [Kant, PP. p. 113]

Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's republics are capable of achieving peace among themselves because they exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics. These international rights of republics derive from the representation of foreign individuals, who are our moral equals. Unlike Schumpeter's capitalist democracies, Kant's republics—including our own—remain in a state of war with nonrepublics. Liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from nonrepublics that are not constrained by representation. Even though wars often cost more than the economic return they generate, liberal republics also are prepared to protect and promote—sometimes forcibly—democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights to noninterference. These wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; they also can generate enormous suffering.

Preserving the legacy of the liberal peace without succumbing to the legacy of liberal imprudence is both a moral and a strategic challenge. The bipolar stability of the international system, and the near certainty of mutual devastation resulting from a nuclear war between the superpowers, have created a "crystal ball effect" that has helped to constrain the tendency toward miscalculation present at the outbreak of so many wars in the past (Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Huntington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear peace" appears to be limited to the superpowers. It has not
curbed military interventions in the Third World. Moreover, it is subject to a desperate technological race designed to overcome its constraints and to crises that have pushed even the superpowers to the brink of war. We must still reckon with the war fevers and moods of appeasement that have almost alternately swept liberal democracies.

Yet restraining liberal imprudence, whether aggressive or passive, may not be possible without threatening liberal pacification. Improving the strategic acumen of our foreign policy calls for introducing steadier strategic calculations of the national interest in the long run and more flexible responses to changes in the international political environment. Constraining the indiscriminate meddling of our foreign interventions calls for a deeper appreciation of the "particularism of history, culture, and membership" (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the improvement in strategy and the constraint on intervention seem, in turn, to require an executive freed from the restraints of a representative legislature in the management of foreign policy and a political culture indifferent to the universal rights of individuals. These conditions, in their turn, could break the chain of constitutional guarantees, the respect for representative government, and the web of transnational contact that have sustained the pacific union of liberal states.

Perpetual peace, Kant says, is the end point of the hard journey his republics will take. The promise of perpetual peace, the violent lessons of war, and the experience of a partial peace are proof of the need for and the possibility of world peace. They are also the grounds for moral citizens and statesmen to assume the duty of striving for peace.

Notes
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1. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to have been the first to point out (in contemporary foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democracies to maintain peace among themselves, and he made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implications of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp. 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J. Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarianism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the postwar period that drew on an unpublished study (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Understanding Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discussion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I survey the period from 1790 to the present and find no war among liberal states.

2. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the significance of the distribution of alliance partners in World War I. He found that the possibility that the actual distribution of alliance partners could have occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972, p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an equal possibility that any two nations could have gone to war with each other, and this is a strong assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion of the issue of statistical significance as it applies to his libertarian thesis.

3. There are serious studies showing that Marxist regimes have higher military spending per capita than non-Marxist regimes (Payne, n.d.), but this should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian governments or of the inherent and global peacefulness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in particular, represent a minority in the current international system; they are strategically encircled, and due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing defenses against both external and internal enemies. Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragility, have little incentive to engage in foreign military adventures. According to Walter Clemens (1982, pp. 117-18), the United States intervened in the Third World more than twice as often during the period 1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. Relatedly, Posen and VanEvera (1980, p. 105; 1983, pp. 86-89) found that the United States devoted one quarter and the Soviet Union one tenth of their defense budgets to forces designed for Third World interventions (where responding to perceived threats would presumably have a less than purely defensive character).

4. All citations from Kant are from Kant's Political Writings (Kant, 1970), the H. B. Nisbet translation edited by Hans Reiss. The works discussed and the abbreviations by which they are identified in the text are as follows:

PP Perpetual Peace (1795)
UH The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)

3

WOODROW WILSON

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

Gentlemen of the Congress:

... It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by, so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in, and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All
the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be redressed, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to each other determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an unqualified security of life and an absolutely unmoiested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secure only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does not remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a
preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation it is not the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this is the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

4

Hedley Bull

The Idea of International Society

Does Order Exist in World Politics?

The Idea of International Society

Throughout the history of the modern states system there have been three competing traditions of thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees as work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society. Here I shall state what is essential to the Grotian or internationalist idea of international society, and what divides it from the Hobbesian or realist tradition on the one hand, and from the Kantian or universalist tradition on the other. Each of these traditional patterns of thought embodies a description of the nature of international politics and a set of prescriptions about international conduct.

The Hobbesian tradition describes international relations as a state of war of all against all, an arena of struggle in which each state is pitted against every other. International relations, on the Hobbesian view, represent pure conflict between states and resemble a game that is wholly distributive or zero-sum: the interests of each state exclude the interests of any other. The particular international activity that, on the Hobbesian view, is most typical of international activity as a whole, or best provides the clue to it, is war itself. Thus peace, on the Hobbesian view, is a period of recuperation from the last war and preparation for the next.

The Hobbesian prescription for international conduct is that the state is free to pursue its goals in relation to other states without moral or legal restrictions of any kind. Ideas of morality and law, on this view, are valid only in the context of a society, but international life is beyond the bounds of any society. If any moral or legal goals are to be pursued in international politics, these can only be the moral or legal goals of the state itself. Either it is held (as by Machiavelli) that the state conducts foreign policy in a kind of moral and legal vacuum, or it is held (as by Hegel and his successors) that moral behaviour for the state in foreign policy lies in its own self-assertion. The only rule or principles which, for those in the Hobbesian tradition, may be said to limit or circumscribe the behaviour of states in their relations with one another are rules of prudence or expediency. Thus agreements may be kept if it is expedient to keep them, but may be broken if it is not.

The Kantian or universalist tradition, at the other extreme, takes the essential nature of international politics to lie not in conflict among states, as on the Hobbesian view, but in the transnational social bonds that link the individual human beings who are the subjects or citizens of states. The dominant theme of international relations, on the Kantian view, is only apparently the relationship among states, and is really the relationship among all men in the community of mankind—which exists potentially, even if it does not exist actually, and which when it comes into being will sweep the system of states into limbo.

Within the community of all mankind, on the universalist view, the interests of all men are one and the same; international politics, considered from this perspective, is not a purely distributive or zero-sum game, as the Hobbesians maintain, but a purely cooperative or non-zero-sum game. Conflicts of interest exist among the ruling cliques of states, but this is only at the superficial or transient level of the existing system of states; properly understood, the interests of all peoples are the same. The particular international activity which, on the Kantian view, most typifies international activity as a whole is the horizontal conflict of ideology that cuts across the boundaries of states and divides human society into two camps—the trustees of the immanent community of mankind and those who stand in its way, those who are of the true faith and the heretics, the liberators and the oppressed.
The Kantian or universalist view of international morality is that, in contrast to the Hobbesian conception, there are moral imperatives in the field of international relations limiting the action of states, but that these imperatives of the system of states and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society. The international politics, in the sense that the forces to bring it into being are that sustain coexistence and social intercourse among states should be ignored if the imperatives of this higher morality require it. Good faith with heretics has no meaning, except in terms of tactical convenience; between the elect and the damned, the liberators and the oppressed, the question of mutual acceptance of rights to sovereignty or independence does not arise.

What has been called the Grotian or internationalist tradition stands between the realist tradition and the universalist tradition. The Grotian tradition describes international politics in terms of a society of states or international society. As against the Hobbesian tradition, the Grotians contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions, but as against the Kantian or universalist perspective the Grotians accept the Hobbesian premise that sovereign states are the principal reality in international politics; the immediate members of international society are states rather than individual human beings. International politics, in the Grotian understanding, expresses neither complete conflict of interest between states nor complete identity of interests: it resembles a game that is partly distributive but also partly productive. The particular international activity which, on the Grotian view, best typifies international activity as a whole is neither war between states, nor horizontal conflict cutting across the boundaries of states, but trade—or, more generally, economic and social intercourse between one country and another.

The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states, in their dealings with one another, are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form. As against the view of the Hobbesians, states in the Grotian view are bound not only by rules of prudence of expediency but also by imperatives of morality and law. But, as against the view of the universalists, what these imperatives enjoin is not the overthrow of the system of states and its replacement by a universal community of mankind, but rather acceptance of the requirements of coexistence and cooperation in a society of states.

Each of these traditions embodies a great variety of doctrines about international politics, among which there exists only a loose connection. In different periods each pattern of thought appears in a different idiom and in relation to different issues and preoccupations. This is not the place to explore further the connections and distinctions within each tradition. Here we have only to take account of the fact that the Grotian idea of international society has always been present in thought about the states system, and to indicate in broad terms the metamorphoses which, in the last three to four centuries, it has undergone...

The Element of Society

My contention is that the element of a society has always been present, and remains present, in the modern international system, although only as one of the elements in it, whose survival is sometimes precarious. The modern international system in fact reflects all three of the elements singled out, respectively, by the Hobbesian, the Kantian and the Grotian traditions: the element of war and struggle for power among states, the element of transnational solidarity and conflict, cutting across the divisions among states, and the element of cooperation and regulated intercourse among states. In different historical phases of the states system, in different geographical theatres of its operation, and in the policies of different states and statesmen, one of these three elements may predominate over the others...

Because international society is no more than one of the basic elements at work in modern international politics, and is always in competition with the elements of a state of war and of transnational solidarity or conflict, it is always erroneous to interpret international events as if international society were the sole or the dominant element. This is the error committed by those who speak or write as if the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations or the United Nations were the principal factors in international politics in their respective times; as if international law were to be assessed only in relation to the function it has of binding states together, and not also in relation to its function as an instrument of state interest and as a vehicle of transnational purposes; as if attempts to maintain a balance of power were to be interpreted only as endeavours to preserve the system of states, and not also as manoeuvres on the part of particular powers to gain ascendancy; as if great powers were to be regarded only as "great responsible" or "great indispensable," and not also as great predators; as if wars were to be continued only as attempts to violate the law or to uphold it, and not also simply as attempts to advance the interests of particular states or of transnational groups. The element of international society is real, but the elements of a state of war and of transnational loyalties and divisions are real also, and to reify the first element, or to speak as if it annulled the second and third, is an illusion.

Moreover, the fact that international society provides some element of order in international politics should not be taken as justifying an attitude of complacency about it, or as showing that the arguments of those who are dissatisfied with the order provided by international society are without foundation. The order provided within modern international society is precarious and imperfect. To show that modern international society has provided some degree of order is not to have shown that order in world politics could not be provided more effectively by structures of a quite different kind.
Relations Among Sovereigns

OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND, AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY

MEN BY NATURE EQUALL

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederaie with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concouring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.

From Equality Proceeds Difidence

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delection only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

From Difidence Warre

And from this difidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out of Civil States, There Is Always Warre of Every One Against Every One

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For warre, consisteth not in Battell only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.

The Incommodities of Such a War

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and tender men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his cheste; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him: what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chestes. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know; nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small Families, the concord thereof depended on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to fear; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continual jealousy, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointed, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continuall Spies upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

In Such a Warre, Nothing Is Unjust

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinal vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society; not in Solitude. It is consequent: also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions That Incline Men to Peace

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature...
THE REALIST CRITIQUE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF REALISM

Realism enters the field far behind utopianism and by way of reaction from it. The thesis that “justice is the right of the stronger” was, indeed, familiar in the Hellenic world. But it never represented anything more than the protest of an uninfluential minority, puzzled by the divergence between political theory and political practice. Under the supremacy of the Roman Empire, and later of the Catholic Church, the problem could hardly arise; for the political good, first of the empire, then of the church, could be regarded as identical with moral good. It was only with the breakup of the mediaeval system that the divergence between political theory and political practice became acute and challenging. Machiavelli is the first important political realist.

Machiavelli’s starting-point is a revolt against the utopianism of current political thought:

It being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been seen and known, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to live that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.

The three essential tenets implicit in Machiavelli’s doctrine are the foundation-stones of the realist philosophy. In the first place, history is a sequence of cause and effect, whose course can be analysed and understood by intellectual effort, but not (as the utopians believe) directed by “imagination.” Secondly, theory does not (as the utopians assume) create practice, but practice theory.

In Machiavelli's words, "good counsels, wheresoeuer they come, are born of the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels." Thirdly, politics are not (as the utopians pretend) a function of ethics, but ethics of politics. Men "are kept honest by constraint." Machiavelli recognised the importance of morality, but thought that there could be no effective morality where there was no effective authority. Morality is the product of power.

National Interest and the Universal Good

The realist should not ... linger over the inflection of ... pin-pricks through chinks in the utopian defences. His task is to bring down the whole cardboard structure of utopian thought by exposing the hollowness of the material out of which it is built. The weapon of the relativist of thought must be used to demolish the utopian concept of a fixed and absolute standard by which policies and actions can be judged. If theories are revealed as a reflexion of practice and principles of political needs, this discovery will apply to the fundamental theories and principles of the utopian creed, and not least to the doctrine of the harmony of interests which is its essential postulate.

It will not be difficult to show that the utopian, when he preaches the doctrine of the harmony of interests, is innocently and unconsciously adopting Walewski's maxim, and clothing his own interest in the guise of a universal interest for the purpose of imposing it on the rest of the world. "Men come easily to believe that arrangements agreeable to themselves are beneficial to others," as Dicey observed; and theories of the public good, which turn on inspection to be an elegant disguise for some particular interest, are as common in international as in national affairs. The utopian, however eager he may be to establish an absolute standard, does not argue that it is the duty of his country, in conformity with that standard, to put the interest of the world at large before its own interest; for that would be contrary to his theory that the interest of all coincides with the interest of each. He argues that what is best for the world is best for his country, and then reverses the argument to read that what is best for his country is best for the world, the two propositions being, from the utopian standpoint, identical.

The Realist Critique of the Harmony of Interests

The doctrine of the harmony of interests yields readily to analysis in terms of this principle. It is the natural assumption of a prosperous and privileged class, whose members have a dominant voice in the community and are therefore naturally prone to identify its interest with their own. In virtue of this identification, any assailant of the interests of the dominant group is made to incur the odium of assailing the alleged common interest of the whole community, and is told that in making this assault he is attacking his own higher interests. The doctrine of the harmony of interests thus serves as an ingenious moral device invoked, in perfect sincerity, by privileged groups in order to justify and maintain their dominant position. But a further point requires notice. The supremacy within the community of the privileged group may be, and often is, so overwhelming that there is, in fact, a sense in which its interests are those of the community, since its well-being necessarily carries with it some measure of well-being for other members of the community, and its collapse would entail the collapse of the community as a whole. In so far, therefore, as the alleged natural harmony of interests has any reality, it is created by the overwhelming power of the privileged group, and is an excellent illustration of the Machiavellian maxim that morality is the product of power.

British nineteenth-century statesmen, having discovered that free trade promoted British prosperity, were sincerely convinced that, in doing so, it also promoted the prosperity of the world as a whole. British predominance in world trade was at that time so overwhelming that there was a certain undeniable harmony between British interests and the interests of the world. British prosperity flowed over into other countries, and a British economic collapse would have meant world-wide ruin. British free traders could and did argue that protectionist countries were not only egotistically damaging the prosperity of the world as a whole, but were stupidly damaging their own, so that their behaviour was both immoral and muddle-headed. In British eyes, it was irresistibly proved that international trade was a single whole, and flourished or slumped together. Nevertheless, this alleged international harmony of interests seemed a mockery to those under-privileged nations whose inferior status and insignificant stake in international trade were consecrated by it. The revolt against it destroyed that overwhelming British preponderance which had provided a plausible basis for the theory. Economically, Great Britain in the nineteenth century was dominant enough to make a bold bid to impose on the world her own conception of international economic morality. When competition of all against all replaced the domination of the world market by a single Power, conceptions of international economic morality necessarily became chaotic.

Politically, the alleged community of interest in the maintenance of peace, whose ambiguous character has already been discussed, is capitalised in the same way by a dominant nation or group of nations. Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance, and denounces class-war, which might threaten them, so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant Powers. In the past, Roman and British imperialism were commended to the world in the guise of the pax Romana and the pax Britannica. To-day, when no single Power is strong enough to dominate the world, and supremacy is vested in a group of nations, slogans like "collective security" and "resistance to aggression" serve the same purpose of proclaiming an identity of interest between the dominant group and the world as a whole in the maintenance of peace.

The exposure of the real basis of the professedly abstract principles commonly invoked in international politics is the most damning and most
convincing part of the realist indictment of utopianism. The nature of the charge is frequently misunderstood by those who seek to refute it. The charge is not that human beings fail to live up to their principles. It matters little that Wilson, who thought that right was more precious than peace, and Briand, who thought that peace came even before justice, and Mr. Eden, who believed in collective security, failed themselves, or failed to induce their countrymen, to apply these principles consistently. What matters is that these supposedly absolute and universal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time. There is a sense in which peace and cooperation between nations or classes or individuals is a common and universal end irrespective of conflicting interests and politics. There is a sense in which a common interest exists in the maintenance of order, whether it be international order or “law and order” within the nation. But as soon as the attempt is made to apply these supposedly abstract principles to a concrete political situation, they are revealed as the transparent disguises of selfish vested interests. The bankruptcy of utopianism resides not in its failure to live up to its principles, but in the exposure of its inability to provide any absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs.

THE LIMITATIONS OF REALISM

The exposure by realist criticism of the hollowness of the utopian edifice is the first task of the political thinker. It is only when the sham has been demolished that there can be any hope of raising a more solid structure in its place. But we cannot ultimately find a resting place in pure realism; for realism, though logically overwhelming, does not provide us with the springs of action which are necessary even to the pursuit of thought. Indeed, realism itself, if we attack it with its own weapons, often turns out in practice to be just as much conditioned as any other mode of thought. In politics, the belief that certain facts are unalterable or certain trends irresistible, commonly reflects a lack of desire or lack of interest to change or resist them. The impossibility of being a consistent and thorough-going realist is one of the most certain and most curious lessons of political science. Consistent realism excludes four things which appear to be essential ingredients of all effective political thinking: a finite goal, an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment and a ground for action.

We return therefore to the conclusion that any sound political thought must be based on elements of both utopia and reality. Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist performs an indispensable service in unmasking it. But pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible. Having demolished the current utopia with the weapons of realism, we still need to

build a new utopia of our own, which will one day fall to the same weapons. The human will will continue to seek an escape from the logical consequences of realism in the vision of an international order which, as soon as it crystallises itself into concrete political form, becomes tainted with self-interest and hypocrisy, and must once more be attacked with the instruments of realism.

Here, then, is the complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of all political life. Politics are made up of two elements—utopia and reality—belonging to two different planes which can never meet. There is no greater barrier to clear political thinking than failure to distinguish between ideals, which are utopia, and institutions, which are reality.

NOTES
We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps a statesman—past, present, or future—has taken or will take on the political scene. We look over his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power, we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself.

The concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. On the side of the actor, it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum, by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen. A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.

To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observer alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?

Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies, and might well lead us astray. It is true that the knowledge of the statesman’s motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be. It cannot give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies. History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true in both moral and political terms.

3. Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. The idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. Thucydides’ statement, born of the experiences of ancient Greece, that “identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals” was taken up in the nineteenth century by Lord Salisbury’s remark that “the only bond of union that endures” among nations is “the absence of all clashing interests.” It was erected into a general principle of government by George Washington:

A small knowledge of human nature will convince us, that, with far the greatest part of mankind, interest is the governing principle; and that almost every
man is more or less, under its influence. Motives of public virtue may for a
time, or in particular instances, actuate men to the observance of a conduct
purely disinterested, but they are not of themselves sufficient to produce per-
severing conformity to the refined dictates and obligations of social duty. Few
men are capable of making a continual sacrifice of all views of private inter-
est, or advantage, to the common good. It is vain to exalt against the
depravity of human nature on this account; the fact is, the experience of
every age and nation has proved it and we must in a great measure, change
the constitution of man, before we can make it otherwise. No institution, not
built on the presumptive truth of these maxims can succeed.  

It was echoed and enlarged upon in our century by Max Weber's observation:

> Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men.

Yet the “images of the world” created by these ideas have very often served
as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept
actions moving.  

Yet the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period
of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which for-
egn policy is formulated. The goals that might be pursued by nations in their
foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pur-
sued or might possibly pursue.

The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the
manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.
Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of
man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that
end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one
mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both
when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safe-
guards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbican
force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole
justification in its aggrandizement.

Political realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under
which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and the ever pre-
ent threat of large-scale violence, cannot be changed. The balance of power,
for instance, is indeed a perennial element of all pluralistic societies, as the
authors of The Federalist papers well knew; yet it is capable of operating, as it
does in the United States, under the conditions of relative stability and peace-
ful conflict. If the factors that have given rise to these conditions can be dupli-
cated on the international scene, similar conditions of stability and peace will
then prevail there, as they have over long stretches of history among certain
nations.

What is true of the general character of international relations is also true
of the nation state as the ultimate point of reference of contemporary foreign
policy. While the realist indeed believes that interest is the perennial standard
by which political action must be judged and directed, the contemporary
connection between interest and the nation state is a product of history, and is
therefore bound to disappear in the course of history. Nothing in the realist
position militates against the assumption that the present division of the poli-
tical world into nation states will be replaced by larger units of a quite differ-
cent character, more in keeping with the technical potentialities and the moral
requirements of the contemporary world.

The realist parts company with other schools of thought before the all-
important question of how the contemporary world is to be transformed. The
realist is persuaded that this transformation can be achieved only through the
workmanlike manipulation of the perennial forces that have shaped the past
as they will the future. The realist cannot be persuaded that we can bring
about that transformation by confronting a political reality that has its own
laws with an abstract idea that refuses to take those laws into account.

4. Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It
is also aware of the ineluctable tension between the moral command and the
requirements of successful political action. And it is unwilling to gloss over
and obliterate that tension and thus to obfuscate both the moral and the polit-
ical issue by making it appear as though the stark facts of politics were morally
more satisfying than they actually are, and the moral law less exacting than it
actually is.

Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to
the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation, but that they must
be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place... Realism,
then, considers prudence—the weighing of the consequences of alternative
political actions—to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract
determines action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges
action by its political consequences. Classical and medieval philosophy knew
this, and so did Lincoln when he said:

>I do the very best, I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing
>to until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what is said against me
>won't amount to anything. If the end brings me our wrong, ten angels swear-
ing I was right would make no difference.

5. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular
nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. As it distinguishes
between truth and opinion, so it distinguishes between truth and idolatry. All
nations are tempted—and few have been able to resist the temptation for
long—to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in the moral pur-
poses of the universe. To know that nations are subject to the moral law is
one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in
the relations among nations is quite another. There is a world of difference
between the belief that all nations stand under the judgment of God, in-
scrutable to the human mind, and the blasphemous conviction that God is
always on one's side and that what one wills oneself cannot fail to be willed
by God also.
The lighthearted equation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the distortion in judgment which, in the blindness of crusading frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations—in the name of moral principle, ideal, or God himself.

On the other hand, it is exactly the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from both that moral excess and that political folly. For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them. And we are able to do justice to all of them in a dual sense: We are able to judge other nations as we judge our own and, having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own. Moderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.

6. The difference, then, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound. However much the theory of political realism may have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, there is no gainsaying its distinctive intellectual and moral attitude to matters political.

Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the lawyer, the moralist maintain theirs. He thinks in terms of interest defined as power; as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer, of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: “How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?” The lawyer asks: “Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?” The moralist asks: “Is this policy in accord with moral principles?” And the political realist asks: “How does this policy affect the power of the nation?” (Or of the federal government, of Congress, of the party, of agriculture, as the case may be.)

The political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political ones. As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of politics. And he parts company with other schools when they impose standards of thought appropriate to other spheres upon the political sphere.

NOTES

Kenneth N. Waltz

The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory

Like most historians, many students of international politics have been skeptical about the possibility of creating a theory that might help one to understand and explain the international events that interest us. Thus Morgenthau, foremost among traditional realists, was fond of repeating Blaise Pascal's remark that "the history of the world would have been different had Cleopatra's nose been a bit shorter" and then asking "How do you systemize that?" His appreciation of the role of the accidental and the occurrence of the unexpected in politics dampened his theoretical ambition.

The response of neorealists is that, although difficulties abound, some of the obstacles that seem most daunting lie in misapprehensions about theory. Theory obviously cannot explain the accidental or account for unexpected events; it deals in regularities and repetitions and is possible only if these can be identified. A further difficulty is found in the failure of realists to conceive of international politics as a distinct domain about which theories can be fashioned. Morgenthau, for example, insisted on "the autonomy of politics," but he failed to apply the concept to international politics. A theory is a depiction of the organization of a domain and of the connections among its parts. A theory indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies relations among them. In reality, everything is related to everything else, and one domain cannot be separated from others. But theory isolates one realm from all others in order to deal with it intellectually. By defining the structure of international political systems, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes a theory about it possible.

In developing a theory of international politics, neorealism retains the main tenets of realpolitik, but means and ends are viewed differently, as are causes and effects. Morgenthau, for example, thought of the "rational" statesman as ever striving to accumulate more and more power. He viewed power as an end in itself. Although he acknowledged that nations at times act out of considerations other than power, Morgenthau insisted that, when they do so,
their actions are not "of a political nature." In contrast, neorealism sees power as a possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. Excessive weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would have dissuaded an adversary from launching. Excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state. Because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it. In crucial situations, however, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security. This revision is an important one.

An even more important revision is found in a shift of causal relations. The infinite materials of any realm can be organized in endlessly different ways. Realism thinks of causes as moving in only one direction, from the interactions of individuals and states to the outcomes that their acts and interactions produce. Morgenthau recognized that, when there is competition for scarce goods and no one to serve as arbiter, a struggle for power will ensue among the competitors and that consequently the struggle for power can be explained without reference to the evil born in men. The struggle for power arises simply because men want things, not because of the evil in their desires. He labeled man's desire for scarce goods as one of the two roots of conflict, but, even while discussing it, he seemed to pull toward the "other root of conflict and concomitant evil"—"the animus dominandi, the desire for power." He often considered that man's drive for power is more basic than the chance conditions under which struggles for power occur. This attitude is seen in his statement that "in a world where power counts, no nation pursuing a rational policy has a choice between renouncing and wanting power; and, if it could, the lust for power for the individual's sake would still confront us with its less spectacular yet no less pressing moral defects."

Students of international politics have typically inferred outcomes from salient attributes of the actors producing them. Thus Marxists, like liberals, have linked the outbreak of war or the prevalence of peace to the internal qualities of states. Governmental forms, economic systems, social institutions, political ideologies—these are but a few examples of where the causes of war have been found. Yet, although causes are specifically assigned, we know that states with widely divergent economic institutions, social customs, and political ideologies have all fought wars. More striking still, many different sorts of organizations fight wars, whether those organizations be tribes, petty principalities, empires, nations, or street gangs. If one identifies a condition seems to have caused a given war, one must wonder why wars occur repeatedly even though their causes vary. Variations in the characteristics of the states are not linked directly to the outcomes that their behaviors produce, nor are variations in their patterns of interaction. Many historians, for example, have claimed that World War I was caused by the interaction of two opposed and closely balanced coalitions. But then many have claimed that World War II was caused by the failure of some states to combine forces in an effort to right an imbalance of power created by an existing alliance.

Neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit-level explanations of traditional realism. By emphasizing how structures affect actions and outcomes, neorealism rejects the assumption that man's innate lust for power constitutes a sufficient cause of war in the absence of any other. It recognizes the causal link between interacting units and international outcomes. According to the logic of international politics, one must believe that some causes of international outcomes are the result of interactions at the unit level, and, since variations in presumed causes do not correspond very closely to variations in observed outcomes, one must also assume that others are located at the structural level. Causes at the level of units interact with those at the level of structure, and, because they do so, explanation at the unit level alone is bound to be misleading. If an approach allows the consideration of both unit-level and structural-level causes, then it can cope with both the changes and the continuities that occur in a system.

Structural realism presents a systemic portrait of international politics depicting component units according to the manner of their arrangement. For the purpose of developing a theory, states are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system's constituent units. The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy—the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force. Changes of structure and hence of system occur with variations in the number of great powers. The range of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which they act.

A systems theory of international politics deals with forces at the national, and not at the national, level. With both systems-level and unit-level forces in play, how can one construct a theory of international politics without simultaneously constructing a theory of foreign policy? An international political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the firm. Systems theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it. Such theories tell us about the forces to which the units are subjected. From them, we can draw some inferences about the expected behavior and fate of the units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish. To the extent that the dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable. How do we expect firms to respond to differently structured markets, and states to differently structured international-political systems? These theoretical questions require us to take firms as firms, and states as states, without paying attention to differences among them. The questions are then answered by reference to the placement of the units in their system and not by reference to the internal qualities of the units. Systems theories explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges.
Conversely, theories at the unit level tell us why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system. A theory about foreign policies is a theory at the national level. It leads to expectations about the responses that dissimilar policies will make to external pressures. A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations although it claims to explain only certain aspects of them. It can tell us what international conditions national policies have to cope with.

From the vantage point of neorealist theory, competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound. Preoccupation with identifying dangers and countering them become a way of life. Relations remain tense; the actors are usually suspicious and often hostile even though by nature they may not be given to suspicion and hostility. Individually, states may only be doing what they can to bolster their security. Their individual intentions aside, collectively their actions yield arms races and alliances. The uneasy state of affairs is exacerbated by the familiar "security dilemma," wherein measures that enhance one state's security typically diminish that of others. In an anarchic domain, the source of one's own comfort is the source of another's worry. Hence a state that is amassing instruments of war, even for its own defense, is cast by others as a threat requiring response. The response itself then serves to confirm the first state's belief that it had reason to worry. Similarly an alliance that in the interest of defense moves to increase cohesion among its members and add to its ranks inadvertently impairs an opposing alliance and provokes countermeasures.

Some states may hunger for power for power's sake. Neorealist theory, however, shows that it is not necessary to assume an innate lust for power in order to account for the sometimes fierce competition that marks the international arena. In an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety.

Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia. Neorealists point not to the ambitions or the intrigues that punctuate the outbreak of individual conflicts but instead to the existing structure within which events, whether by design or accident, can precipitate open clashes of arms. The origins of hot wars lie in cold wars, and the origins of cold wars are found in the anarchic ordering of the international arena.

The recurrence of war is explained by the structure of the international system. Theorists explain what historians know: War is normal. Any given war is explained not by looking at the structure of the international-political system but by looking at the particularities within it: the situations, the characters, and the interactions of states. Although particular explanations are found at the unit level, general explanations are also needed. Wars vary in frequency, and in other ways as well. A central question for a structural theory is this: How do changes of the system affect the expected frequency of war?

**KEEPING WARS COLD: THE STRUCTURAL LEVEL**

In an anarchic realm, peace is fragile. The prolongation of peace requires that potentially destabilizing developments elicit the interest and the calculated response of some or all of the system's principal actors. In the anarchy of states, the price of inattention or miscalculation is often paid in blood. An important issue for a structural theory to address is whether stabilizing conditions and events are managed better in multipolar or bipolar systems.

In a system of, say, five great powers, the politics of power turns on the diplomacy by which alliances are made, maintained, and disrupted. Flexibility of alignment means both that the country one is wooing may prefer another suitor and that one's present alliance partner may defect. Flexibility of alignment limits a state's options because, ideally, its strategy must please potential allies and satisfy present partners. Alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states. Divergence comes when positive interests are at issue. In alliances among equals, strategies are always the product of compromise since the interests of allies and their notions of how to secure them are never identical.

If competing blocs are seen to be closely balanced, and if competition turns on important matters, then to let one's side down risks one's own destruction. In a moment of crisis the weaker or the more adventurous party is likely to determine its side's policy. Its partners can afford neither to let the weaker member be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risks.

The prelude to World War I provides striking examples of such a situation. The approximate equality of partners in both the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente made them closely interdependent. This interdependence, combined with the keen competition between the two camps, meant that, although any country could commit its associates, no one country on either side could exercise control. If Austria-Hungary marched, Germany had to follow; the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would have left Germany alone in the middle of Europe. If France marched, Russia had to follow; a German victory over France would be a defeat for Russia. And so the vicious circle continued. Because the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its forces to the aims and fears of its partners.

In alliances among equals, the defection of one member threatens the security of the others. In alliances among unequals, the contributions of the lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively small importance. In alliances among unequals, alliance leaders need worry little about the faithfulness of their followers, who usually have little choice anyway. Contrast the situation in 1914 with that of the United States and Britain and France in 1936. The United States could dissociate itself from the Suez adventure of its two principal allies and subject one of them to heavy financial pressure. Like Austria-Hungary in 1914, Britain and France tried to commit or at least immobilize
their ally by presenting a fait accompli. Enjoying a position of predominance, the United States could continue to focus its attention on the major adversary while disciplining its two allies. Opposing Britain and France endangered neither the United States nor the alliance because the security of Britain and France depended much more heavily on us than our security depended on them. The ability of the United States, and the inability of Germany, to pay a price measured in intra-alliance terms is striking.

In balance-of-power politics old style, flexibility of alignment led to rigidity of strategy or the limitation of freedom of decision. In balance-of-power politics new style, the obverse is true: Rigidity of alignment in a two-power world results in more flexibility of strategy and greater freedom of decision. In a multipolar world, roughly equal parties engaged in cooperative endeavors must look for the common denominator of their policies. They risk finding the lowest one and easily end up in the worst of all possible worlds. In a bipolar world, alliance leaders can design strategies primarily to advance their own interests and to cope with their main adversary and less to satisfy their own allies.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has to seek the approval of other states, but each has to cope with the other. In the great-power politics of a multipolar world, who is a danger to whom and who can be expected to deal with threats and problems are matters of uncertainty. In the great-power politics of a bipolar world, who is a danger to whom is never in doubt. Any event in the world that involves the fortunes of either of the great powers automatically elicits the interest of the other. President Harry S. Truman, at the time of the Korean invasion, could not very well echo Neville Chamberlain’s words in the Czechoslovakian crisis by claiming that the Americans knew nothing about the Koreans, a people living far away in the east of Asia. We had to know about them or quickly find out.

In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other. As a result, the powers in a bipolar world promptly respond to unsettling events. In a multipolar world, dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily obscured. Where a number of states are in balance, the skillful foreign policy of a forward power is designed to gain an advantage without antagonizing other states and frightening them into united action. At times in modern Europe, the benefits of possible gains have seemed to outweigh the risks of likely losses. Statesmen have hoped to push an issue to the limit without causing all of the potential opponents to unite. When there are several possible enemies, unity of action among them is difficult to achieve. National leaders could therefore think—or desperately hope, as did Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Adolf Hitler before two world wars—that a united opposition would not form.

If interests and ambitions conflict, the absence of crises is more wortwhile than their presence. Crises are produced by the determination of a state to resist a change that another state tries to make. As the leaders in a bipolar system, the United States and the Soviet Union are disposed to do the resisting, for in important matters they cannot hope that their allies will do it for them. Political action in the postwar world has reflected this condition. Communist guerrillas operating in Greece prompted the Truman Doctrine. The tightening of Soviet control over the states of Eastern Europe led to the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Defense Treaty, and these in turn gave rise to the Cominform and the Warsaw Pact. The plan to create a West German government produced the Berlin blockade. During the past four decades, our responses have been geared to the Soviet Union’s actions, and theirs to ours.

Miscalculation by some or all of the great powers is a source of danger in a multipolar world; overreaction by either or both of the great powers is a source of danger in a bipolar world. Which is worse: miscalculation or overreaction? Miscalculation is the greater evil because it is more likely to permit an unfolding of events that finally threatens the status quo and brings the powers to war. Overreaction is the lesser evil because at worst it costs only money for unnecessary arms and possibly the fighting of limited wars. The dynamics of a bipolar system, moreover, provide a measure of correction. In a world in which two states united in their mutual antagonism overshadow any others, the benefits of a calculated response stand out most clearly, and the sanctions against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest force. Thus two states, isolationist by tradition, untutored in the ways of international politics, and famed for impulsive behavior, have shown themselves—not always and everywhere, but always in crucial cases—to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible, and forbearing.

Moreover, the economies of the great powers in a bipolar world are less interdependent than those of the great powers of a multipolar one. The size of great powers tends to increase as their numbers fall, and the larger a state is, the greater the variety of its resources. States of continental size do proportionately less of their business abroad than, for example, Britain, France, and Germany did in their heydays. Never before in modern history have the great powers depended so little on the outside world, and been so uninvolved in one another’s economic affairs, as the United States and the Soviet Union have been since the war. The separation of their interests reduces the occasions for dispute and permits them, if they wish, to leave each other alone even though each defines its security interests largely in terms of the other.

Interdependence of parties, diffusion of dangers, confusion of responses: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a multipolar world. Self-dependence of parties, clarity of dangers, certainty about who has to face them: These are the characteristics of great-power politics in a bipolar world.

**KEEPING WARS COLD: THE UNIT LEVEL**

A major reason for the prolongation of the postwar peace is the destruction of the old multipolar world in **World War II** and its replacement by a bipolar one. In a bipolar world, we expect competition to be keen, yet manageable. But to believe that bipolarity alone accounts for the “long peace” between the
United States and the Soviet Union is difficult. Given the depth and extent of
the distrust felt by both parties, one may easily believe that one or another of
the crises that have experienced would, in earlier times, have drawn them
into war. For a fuller explanation of why that did not happen, we must look
to that other great force for peace: nuclear weapons.

States continue to coexist in an anarchic order. Self-help is the principle of
action in such an order, and the most important way in which states must help
themselves is by providing for their own security. Therefore, in weighing
the chances of peace, the first questions to ask are questions about the ends
for which states use force and about the strategies and weapons they employ. The
chances of peace rise if states can achieve their most important ends without
actively using force. War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation
to the possible gains. Realist theory, old and new alike, draws attention to the
important role of military technology and strategy in determining the forces that fix
the fate of states and their systems.

Nuclear weapons dissuade states from going to war much more surely
than conventional weapons do. In a conventional world, states can believe
both that they may win and that, should they lose, the price of defeat will
be bearable, although World Wars I and II called the latter belief into question
even before atomic bombs were dropped. If the United States and the Soviet
Union were now armed only with conventional weapons, the lessons of those
wars would be clearly remembered, especially by the Soviet Union, which suf-
f ered more in war than the United States. Had the atom never been split, those
two nations would still have much to fear from each other. Armed with
increasingly destructive conventional weapons, they would be constrained to
strive earnestly to avoid war. Yet, in a conventional world, even sad and strong
lessons like those of the two world wars have proved exceedingly difficult for
states to learn. Throughout modern history, one great power or another has
looked as though it might become dangerously strong: for example, France
under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, and Germany under Wilhelm II
and Hitler. In each case, an opposing coalition formed and turned the expa-
nsive state back. The lessons of history would seem to be clear: in international
politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one
state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others. The leaders of
expansionist states have nevertheless been able to persuade themselves that
skillful diplomacy and clever strategy would enable them to transcend the
normal processes of balance-of-power politics.

The experience of World War II, bipolarity, and the increased destructiveness
of conventional weapons would make World War III more difficult to start than
earlier wars were, and the presence of nuclear weapons dramatically increases
that difficulty. Nuclear weapons reverse or negate many of the conventional
causes of war. Wars can be fought in the face of nuclear weapons, but the higher
the stakes and the closer a country comes to winning them, the less surely
that country invites retaliation and risks its own destruction. The accumulation
of significant power through conquest, even if only conventional weapons are used,
is no longer possible in the world of nuclear powers. Those individuals who
believe that the Soviet Union's leaders are so bent on world domination that
they may be willing to run catastrophic risks for problematic gains fail to under-
stand how governments behave. Do we expect to lose one city or two? Two
cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, political leaders stop think-
ing about running risks and start worrying about how to avoid them.

Deterrence is more easily achieved than most military strategists would
have us believe. In a conventional world, a country can sensibly attack if it
believes that success is probable. In a nuclear world, a country cannot sensi-
ibly attack unless it believes that success is assured. A nation will be deterred
from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adver-
sary will retaliate. Uncertainty of response, not certainty, is required for deter-
rence because, if retaliation occurs, one risks losing all. As Clausewitz wrote: If
war approaches the absolute, it becomes imperative 'not to take the first
step without thinking what may be the last.'

Nuclear weapons make the implications even of victory too horrible to con-
template. The problem that the nuclear powers must solve is how to per-
petuate peace when it is not possible to eliminate all of the causes of war. The
structure of international politics has not been transformed; it remains anar-
chic in form. Nuclear states continue to compete militarily. With each state
striving to ensure its own security, war remains constantly possible. In the
anarchy of states, improving the means of defense and deterrence relative to
the means of offense increases the chances of peace. Weapons and strategies
that make defense and deterrence easier, and offensive strikes harder to mount,
decrease the likelihood of war.

Although the possibility of war remains, the probability of a war involv-
ing states with nuclear weapons has been drastically reduced. Over the cen-
turies great powers have fought more wars than minor states, and the frequency
of war has correlated more closely with a structural characteristic— their inter-
national standing—than with unit-level attributes. Yet, because of a change in
military technology, a change at the unit level, waging war has increasingly
become the privilege of poor and weak states. Nuclear weapons have ban-
ished war from the center of international politics. A unit-level change has
dramatically reduced a structural effect.

The probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons
approaches zero. But the "real war" may, as James claimed, lie in the prepara-
tions for waging it. The logic of a deterrent strategy, if it is followed, also cir-
cumscribes the causes of "real wars." In a conventional world, the structure
of international politics encourages states to arm competitively. In a nuclear
world, deterrent strategies offer the possibility of dampening the competition.
Conventional weapons are relative. With conventional weapons, competing
countries must constantly compare their strengths. How secure a country is
depends on how it compares to others in the quantity and quality of its weap-
onry, the suitability of its strategy, the resilience of its society and economy,
and the skill of its leaders.

Nuclear weapons are not relative but absolute weapons. They make it
possible for a state to limit the size of its strategic forces so long as other states
WARS, HOT AND COLD

Wars, hot and cold, originate in the structure of the international political system. Most Americans blame the Soviet Union for creating the Cold War, by the actions that follow necessarily from the nature of its society and government. Revisionist historians, attacking the dominant view, assign blame to the United States. Some American error, or sinister interest, or faulty assumption about Soviet aims, they argue, is what started the Cold War. Either way, the main point is lost. In a bipolar world, each of the two great powers is bound to focus its fears on the other, to distrust its motives, and to impute offensive intentions to defensive measures. The proper question is what, not who, started the Cold War. Although its content and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics, and will last as long as that structure endures.

In any closely competitive system, it may seem that one is either paranoid or a loser. The many Americans who ascribe paranoia to the Soviet Union are saying little about its political elite and much about the international-political system. Yet, in the presence of nuclear weapons, the Cold War has not become a hot one, a raging war among major states. Constraints on fighting big wars have bound the major nuclear states into a system of uneasy peace. Hot wars originate in the structure of international politics. So does the Cold War, with its temperature kept low by the presence of nuclear weapons.

NOTES


JOHN A. HOBBIN

THE ECONOMIC TAPROOTS OF IMPERIALISM

... American Imperialism was the natural product of the economic pressure of a sudden advance of capitalism which could not find occupation at home and needed foreign markets for goods and for investments.

The same needs existed in European countries, and, as is admitted, drove Governments along the same path. Overproduction in the sense of an excessive manufacturing plant, and surplus capital which could not find sound investments within the country, forced Great Britain, Germany, Holland, France to place larger and larger portions of their economic resources outside the area of their present political domain, and then stimulate a policy of political expansion so as to take in the new areas. The economic sources of this movement are laid bare by periodic trade-depressions due to an inability of producers to find adequate and profitable markets for what they can produce. The Majority Report of the Commission upon the Depression of Trade in 1885 put the matter in a nutshell. "That, owing to the nature of the times, the demand for our commodities does not increase at the same rate as formerly;